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INTRODUCTION

Wage theft is a simple idea: an employer steals an employee’s
wages.1 In the early 2000s, advocates in the United States first
deployed this term to frame employers’ failure to comply with wage
and hour laws not merely as noncompliance, but as real theft, akin to
what attorneys general (AGs) and district attorneys (DAs) prosecute
every day.2 Historically, though, wage theft in the United States has
been addressed exclusively by government agencies charged with
enforcing these labor laws3 — typically departments of labor — or by
workers bringing civil actions.4 These traditional enforcement tools,
however, have failed to contain the wage theft epidemic,5 which costs
workers and society around $15 billion each year.6 So how can
workers find relief?
In the United States and most other countries, a labor inspectorate
is the primary mechanism to ensure employer compliance with labor
1. For a description of the manifold strategies by which employers steal workers’
wages, see KIM BOBO, WAGE THEFT IN AMERICA: WHY MILLIONS OF WORKING
AMERICANS ARE NOT GETTING PAID — AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT 23–41
(2014) (including paying below the minimum wage, not compensating for all hours
worked, paying checks with insufficient funds, not paying or misclassifying workers as
“exempt” from overtime, or simply not paying people at all).
2. César F. Rosado Marzán identifies 2005 as the year when advocates began to
use the term to call attention to this practice. See César F. Rosado Marzán, Wage
Theft as Crime: An Institutional View, 20 J.L. SOC’Y 300, 302 (2020) [hereinafter
Rosado Marzán, Wage Theft as Crime]. Kim Bobo’s 2009 book is recognized as the
first mainstream use of the term. See Nicole Hallett, The Problem of Wage Theft, 37
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 93, 98 n.21 (2018). But see Sarah Green, Wage Theft as a
Legal Concept, in CRIMINALITY AT WORK 134, 134 (Alan Bogg et al. eds., 2020)
(arguing why this practice does not constitute theft).
3. This Note will employ the term “labor law” to encompass the range of laws
regulating the U.S. workplace and employment standards, unless specified otherwise.
4. The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), which governs wage and hour laws at
the federal level, provides employees a right to bring federal claims under the Act.
See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). The Wage and Hour Division (WHD) of the Department of
Labor (DOL) enforces the FLSA. See Enforcement, U.S. DEP’T LAB.,
https://www.dol.gov/general/topic/youthlabor/enforcement [https://perma.cc/4FGCYJW7] (last visited Nov. 7, 2020).
5. See Jennifer J. Lee & Annie Smith, Regulating Wage Theft, 94 WASH. L. REV.
759, 769 (2019) (“Most government agencies responsible for enforcement allow
employers to act with impunity by failing to adequately enforce existing wage and
hour laws. The agencies may lack motivation or resources to enforce the law. A 2018
investigation found that six states lacked a single investigator to investigate minimum
wage violations.” (citations omitted)); see also DAVID COOPER & TERESA KROEGER,
ECON. POL’Y INST., EMPLOYERS STEAL BILLIONS FROM WORKERS’ PAYCHECKS EACH
YEAR 5–6 (2017), https://files.epi.org/pdf/125116.pdf [https://perma.cc/4YDM-8KFR]
(describing declining numbers of inspectors and how few workers are able to bring
private claims and what percentage of them ultimately receive any restitution).
6. See COOPER & KROEGER, supra note 5, at 1.
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laws.7 Labor inspectorates struggle to do just that, particularly in lowwage industries.8 This “enforcement gap” is well-documented: for
decades, scholars have analyzed different inspectorate regimes
throughout the world, identified failures and best practices, and
proposed ways to reorganize inspectorates to better enforce the law.9
By building on their work, this Note focuses explicitly on how the
U.S. enforcement system has failed to address the epidemic of wage
theft, particularly for low-wage workers.
To analyze the United States’s enforcement gap, this Note will
review some of the scholarly proposals to restructure inspectorate
operations. It does not seek to solve the particular challenges that the
U.S. inspection regime faces or even to address them in a
comprehensive way. Rather, by acknowledging both the immensity
of requisite reforms and the foreseeable political inability of achieving
them, this Note advocates for a specific intervention in certain
circumstances to enforce bad actor employers who steal from their
workers.
Analysis of inspectorates shows that, absent profound policy
change, the U.S. inspectorate lacks the most punitive enforcement
techniques that other countries’ inspectors use to compel compliance
— large monetary fines, license suspension or revocation, or jail

7. See INT’L LAB. OFF., LABOUR INSPECTION: WHAT IT IS AND WHAT IT DOES 8,
https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/—-ed_dialogue/—lab_admin/documents/instructionalmaterial/wcms_141403.pdf
[https://perma.cc/REJ6-J9XW] (last visited Mar. 14, 2021) (“National governments
adopt legislation and policies that promote decent working conditions, in
consultation with employers’ and workers’ organizations and they appoint [labor
inspectorates] to supervise the proper application of such legislation and policies and
to promote their compliance.”).
8. See infra Section I.B. For a global overview of struggles facing inspectorates,
see generally ILO Comm. on Emp. & Soc. Pol’y, Strategies and Practice for Labour
Inspection, GB.297/ESP/3 (Nov. 2006). Scholars define “low-wage work” differently.
This Note will define low-wage workers as those who earn less than two-third of the
median full-time wage in a particular location. See Low-Wage Work in California,
U.C. BERKELEY LAB. CTR., https://laborcenter.berkeley.edu/low-wage-work-incalifornia/#the-numbers [https://perma.cc/5NNF-LH39] (last visited Nov. 8, 2020).
Other scholars define low-wage work as what would be necessary to lift a family of
four above the poverty threshold. See, e.g., LAWRENCE MISHEL, JARED BERNSTEIN &
SYLVIA ALLEGRETTO, THE STATE OF WORKING AMERICA 2006/2007 (2007); see also
Janice Fine, Solving the Problem from Hell: Tripartism as a Strategy for Addressing
Labour Standards Non-Compliance in the United States, 50 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 813,
814 n.1 (2013).
9. See generally INT’L LAB. OFF., LABOUR ADMINISTRATION AND LABOUR
INSPECTION (2011).
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time.10 In the U.S. system, however, other enforcement agents do
hold these tools, namely AGs and DAs.11 In recent years, these law
enforcement lawyers have begun to prosecute bad-actor employers
who steal from and otherwise exploit and endanger their workers,
recovering millions of dollars in stolen wages for workers and
exacting large fines from employers.12 This Note argues that this
work should be expanded under specific conditions that safeguard
workers’ interests and ensure more effective prosecutions.
Some worker advocates have recognized the utility of this
intervention from a complementary perspective: in the current
enforcement gap, responsible criminal law enforcement is a helpful
intervention; prosecutors are one of many actors who can hold lawbreaking employers accountable.13 This Note will argue, however,
that the intervention of DAs and AGs is necessary, not merely
complementary, in the current U.S. system. Because U.S. inspectors
do not possess the punitive tools required to enforce employers who
willfully break the law, they cannot effectively hold accountable bad
actor employers who steal from their employees, absent profound
policy change. To fill this structural enforcement gap, DAs and AGs
should enter the breach. This Note will describe not only the benefits

10. See Kiran Mirchandani & Sheldon Matthew Bromfield, Roundabout Wage
Theft: The Limits of Regulatory Protections for Ontario Workers in Precarious Jobs,
22 J. LAB. & SOC’Y 661, 664 (2019) (“Overall, in the United States, Canada, Australia,
and Britain, the enforcement of labor laws and policies is weak and lacks strong
deterrent penalties for wage theft of all forms . . . .”). Chilean inspectors, for example,
have the ability to issue very large fines for a variety of penalties and suspend work or
close a workplace. See César F. Rosado Marzán, Punishment and Work Law
Compliance: Lessons from Chile, 29 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 343, 365, 378–86
(2012) [hereinafter Rosado Marzán, Punishment and Work Law Compliance]; see
also Janice Fine & Jennifer Gordon, Strengthening Labor Standards Enforcement
Through Partnerships with Workers’ Organizations, 38 POL. & SOC’Y 552, 562 (2011)
(arguing that “license revocation must be a meaningful possibility”); Hallett, supra
note 2, at 115 (describing how, in the absence of federal-level tools, states and
municipalities have begun to experiment with licensing schemes and other penalties).
For further discussion, see infra Section I.B.
11. See infra Section II.C.
12. See infra Section II.C.
13. See, e.g., Arisha Hatch & Terri Gerstein, Representing the People, STAN.
SOC.
INNOVATION
REV.,
Winter
2020,
https://ssir.org/articles/entry/
re_envisioning_the_roles_of_prosecutors_and_attorneys_general_to_make_the_justic
e_system_work_for_everyone# [https://perma.cc/47LP-U42R]; Daniel J. Galvin,

Deterring Wage-Theft: Alt-Labor, State Politics, and the Policy Determinants of
Minimum Wage Compliance, 14 PERSPS. ON POL. 324, 325 (2016) (reviewing
advocates’ championing of criminal penalties as part of an “everything but the
kitchen sink” strategy to address wage theft at the state-level); Rosado Marzán, Wage
Theft as Crime, supra note 2, at 306–07 (arguing that criminalization of wage theft
can help fill the gap created by insufficient enforcement agencies and private claims).
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and drawbacks of encouraging DAs and AGs to enforce labor laws
but also the ideal or necessary circumstances for law enforcement
lawyers to wield these powers in favor of workers, particularly
undocumented workers.
Part I outlines what wage theft is and why the U.S. inspectorate is
unable to curtail it. By examining employers’ economic motivations
for complying with wage and hour law, Part II reviews two primary
ways to increase compliance: raising the likelihood of getting caught
and increasing the penalties for unlawful behavior. Because this Note
does not propose sweeping federal policy changes,14 Part II will
identify one of the interventions15 that is working to address low-wage
worker exploitation: DAs and AGs using their criminal enforcement
powers to hold accountable bad-actor employers. Part III will both
review the challenges this model faces and propose best practices to
safeguard the rights of workers and ensure more successful outcomes
for these cases.
I. U.S. INSPECTORATE’S FAILURE TO ENFORCE LABOR LAWS
A. What Is Wage Theft?

While labor law violations come in many flavors — that often exist
together in workplaces16 — this Note focuses on wage theft as a lens
to analyze enforcement failures and opportunities. Wage theft can

14. Congress indeed has the ability to allocate significantly more resources to
labor inspection and to enable much stiffer penalties. Over the course of the last half
century, however, we have witnessed the opposite: inspector levels have declined
while numbers of workplaces have grown significantly. See Fine & Gordon, supra
note 10, at 554 (describing expanding numbers of employees and employers and
falling numbers of inspectors); see also Galvin, supra note 13, at 327 (demonstrating
that the likelihood of getting investigated was between 0.5% and 1%). In addition to
the low likelihood of getting investigated, civil money penalties have remained
stubbornly low: maximum penalties for willful violations of wage and hour laws are
$1,100, adjusted annually for inflation to $2,074 in 2021. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(e)(2);
Civil
Money
Penalty
Inflation
Adjustments,
U.S.
DEP’T
LAB.,
https://www.dol.gov/agencies/whd/resources/penalties [https://perma.cc/96AP-MKSC]
(last visited Feb. 14, 2021). While they are highly unlikely, this Author would
welcome Congress to make dramatic improvements to U.S. labor law enforcement.
15. For a survey of other anti-wage theft strategies being implemented at the state
level, see generally Lee & Smith, supra note 5; Hallett, supra note 2; Galvin, supra
note 13.
16. See MICHAEL J. PIORE & ANDREW SCHRANK, ROOT-CAUSE REGULATION:
PROTECTING WORK AND WORKERS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 37 (2018)
[hereinafter PIORE & SCHRANK, ROOT-CAUSE REGULATION] (In the United States,
“the same employers often violate multiple laws and nonetheless limit their liability
to the particular violations discovered by specialist inspectors with narrow
jurisdictions and training”).
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take many forms, but it consists of more than an inadvertent payroll
mistake.17 Broadly speaking, employers steal workers’ wages by: “(1)
paying less than the minimum, promised, or overtime wage; (2) taking
unauthorized deductions from a worker’s pay; or (3) failing to pay for
all hours worked.”18 Even if workers know their rights, employers
sometimes use sophisticated techniques to fool employees including:
“time-shaving,” where managers alter time cards by small amounts on
different days; requiring workers to clock out and keep working or to
arrive early to start working before clocking in; or compelling workers
to do preparatory tasks off the clock, like sharpening knives or
changing into protective gear.19
Employers also intentionally
misclassify workers as independent contractors to avoid minimum
wage and overtime regulations, mandatory employer benefit
contributions, tax payments, and more.20
Wage theft costs U.S. workers billions of dollars per year. A 2017
study estimated that in the ten most populous U.S. states, workers
lose around $8 billion to wages stolen by employers.21 Extrapolating
these numbers across all 50 states, the total wages stolen from
workers each year exceeds $15 billion in the United States.22 By way
of comparison, all other property theft in 2017 amounted to $16.4
billion.23
The collateral consequences of wage theft extend
throughout society, increasing workers’ and families’ reliance on
public assistance programs and costing the government — federal,
state, and local — millions of dollars in lost tax revenue each year.24
Critically, the impact of wage theft falls most heavily on low-wage
workers25 who already face significant economic and workplace

17. See supra note 1.
18. Lee & Smith, supra note 5, at 765 (internal citations omitted).
19. See CYNTHIA ESTLUND, REGOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: FROM SELFREGULATION TO CO-REGULATION 62–63 (2010).
20. See FRANÇOISE CARRÉ, ECON. POL’Y INST., (IN)DEPENDENT CONTRACTOR
MISCLASSIFICATION 2 (2015).
21. See COOPER & KROEGER, supra note 5, at 1.
22. See id. at 2.
23. See Luke Darby, Is Your Employer Stealing from You?, GQ (Nov. 8, 2019),
https://www.gq.com/story/wage-theft [https://perma.cc/72RM-GMLN] (quoting a
statistic from the Federal Bureau of Investigation).
24. See COOPER & KROEGER, supra note 5, at 28 (describing not only lost income
tax revenue but also lost sales tax revenue from the stolen income that workers could
not spend).
25. See id. at 8–9 (noting that significant, pervasive violations of core workplace
laws occur in many low-wage industries and that women, immigrants, and people of
color are disproportionately affected by workplace violations).

2021]

MAKING WAGE THEFT COSTLY

115

struggles.26 Despite recent scholarly interest in wage theft, very little
is known about the full extent of the problem.27
Why do employers fail to comply with wage and hour laws? Quite
simply, noncompliance pays: the economic incentives of
noncompliance are much too large compared with the likelihood of
inspection and expected punishment.28 David Weil’s study of the Los
Angeles apparel industry found that — factoring in the likelihood of
inspection and median civil penalty if caught — an employer in 2002
stood to make roughly $11,000 more per worker annually by choosing
noncompliance over compliance.29 If enforcement actions occur at all
in the United States, they typically only secure a portion of back
wages owed.30 While more inspections would change the equation,
insofar as unscrupulous employers would have a higher likelihood of
being discovered, the level of available punishment remains
insufficient to outweigh the employer’s cost savings.31
B. The Broken U.S. Inspectorate

Labor laws traditionally are enforced by labor inspectors who
deploy a range of tools to ensure compliance with the law. How
inspectors do and should work is a topic of significant scholarly
analysis. Setting aside questions of resources — how much money a

26. See Steven Bittle & Laureen Snider, How Employers Steal from Employees:
The Untold Story, 45 SOC. JUST. 119, 137 (2018) (listing struggles that include “the
paucity of their choices and avenues for recourse, the precariousness of their
employment, the underenforcement of employment standards, the advent of
electronic timekeeping, the absence of union representation to support their claims of
unpaid wages, and, for undocumented immigrant workers, the threat of deportation”
(citation omitted)).
27. See Galvin, supra note 13, at 327.
28. See David Weil, Compliance with the Minimum Wage: Can Government
Make a Difference? 9–10 (Jan. 6, 2003) (unpublished manuscript) [hereinafter Weil,
Compliance
with
the
Minimum
Wage],
https://hctar.seas.harvard.edu/files/hctar/files/hr05.pdf
[https://perma.cc/D2QWDZXP]; see also NAT’L EMP. L. PROJECT, WINNING WAGE JUSTICE: AN ADVOCATE’S
GUIDE TO STATE AND CITY POLICIES TO FIGHT WAGE THEFT 17 (2011),
https://www.nelp.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/WinningWageJustice2011.pdf
[https://perma.cc/R4PA-23JW].
29. See Weil, Compliance with the Minimum Wage, supra note 28, at 10.
30. See ESTLUND, supra note 19, at 60. The FLSA allows workers to collect two
years of prior wages or three for “willful violations.” See 29 U.S.C. § 255(a).
31. See Weil, Compliance with the Minimum Wage, supra note 28, at 10; see also
Annette Bernhardt, Michael W. Spiller & Diana Polson, All Work and No Pay:

Violations of Employment and Labor Laws in Chicago, Los Angeles and New York
City, 91 SOC. FORCES 725, 728 (2013) (“[I]n the absence of strong penalties and
enforcement, compliance with workplace laws is best understood as one specific form
of employers’ decision making about labor costs . . . .”); infra Section II.A.
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government allocates to this work — countries have configured and
equipped their inspectorates in two general ways: compliance or
deterrence.32 In countries that follow a compliance approach,
inspectors have broad purview over the labor code and tend to deploy
pedagogical strategies that encourage or educate employers, as
opposed to punishing them.33 By contrast, in the United States and
other countries that adhere to a deterrence or “command-andcontrol” framework, labor inspectors primarily use punitive tools, like
fines, to dissuade employers from breaking the law.34 While legal
scholars debate the comparative effectiveness of compliance and
deterrence approaches, these two models are premised on
fundamentally different assumptions about the causes of labor
violations.35 Under compliance theory, employers may be ignorant or
incompetent but generally do not intentionally contravene the law.36
In contrast, deterrence theory is based on the idea that a substantial

32. See, e.g., PIORE & SCHRANK, ROOT-CAUSE REGULATION, supra note 16, at 5–
8; Leah F. Vosko et al., The Compliance Model of Employment Standards

Enforcement: An Evidence-Based Assessment of Its Efficacy in Instances of Wage
Theft, 48 INDUS. REL. J. 256, 256–57 (2017); JOHN HOWE, TESS HARDY & SEAN
COONEY, CTR. FOR EMP. & LAB. REL. L., TRANSFORMATION OF ENFORCEMENT OF
MINIMUM EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS ENFORCEMENT IN AUSTRALIA 59–60,
https://law.unimelb.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0008/1556738/FWOReportFINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/7YSY-AH8R] (last visited Oct. 21, 2021). Some
countries blend the two models with some success. Brazil and Chile are two particular
examples. See Renato Bignami & Mari Cristina Serrano Barbosa, Labor Inspection

and Wage Theft in Brazil: Justice at the Street Level, Social Peace, and
Development, 37 COMPAR. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 267, 279 (2016); see also Roberto Pires,
Promoting Sustainable Compliance: Styles of Labour Inspection and Compliance
Outcomes in Brazil, 147 INT’L LAB. REV. 199, 200 (2008) (showing examples of how
Brazilian inspectors fashion innovative approaches using their wide discretion in a
“sustainable compliance” framework that combines punitive and pedagogical
approaches); Rosado Marzán, Punishment and Work Law Compliance, supra note
10, at 364–72 (describing the Chilean inspector’s wide discretion to levy large fines
and other punishments or replace fines with training or alternative compliance
programs).
33. See PIORE & SCHRANK, ROOT-CAUSE REGULATION, supra note 16, at 5–6.
France is the classic model for a compliance-based inspectorate. See, e.g., Marc
Vericel, The Labor Inspectorate in France and the Protection of Wages, 37 COMPAR.
LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 299 (2016). Notably, in France, employers are required to carry
wage insurance to allow employees to collect back wages even where an employer
claims insolvency. See Janice Fine, The Franco-Iberian Model from the U.S.
Perspective, 37 COMPAR. LAB. L. & POL’Y 397, 400–02 (2016).
34. See PIORE & SCHRANK, ROOT-CAUSE REGULATION, supra note 16, at 5–6; see
also Michael J. Piore & Andrew Schrank, Toward Managed Flexibility: The Revival
of Labour Inspection in the Latin World, 147 INT’L LAB. REV. 1, 5 (2008) [hereinafter
Piore & Schrank, Toward Managed Flexibility].
35. See Vosko et al., supra note 32, at 259.
36. See id.
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proportion of employers who violate labor laws, including wage and
hour law, have determined they are better off by not complying.37 To
effectively deter law-breaking employers, inspectors must raise the
risk of being caught and/or increase the penalties for breaking the
law.38
Apart from using primarily punitive tools, U.S. inspectors are
specialists who enforce a narrow portion of the labor code, as
opposed to generalists who inspect for violations across the labor
code.39 The U.S. enforcement regime is divided horizontally between
various federal agencies and vertically between federal and state
agencies.40 Different federal agencies and their inspectors are tasked
with enforcing very particular labor laws,41 often overlapping with
their state counterparts. For example, the Wage and Hour Division
(WHD) can only enforce wage and hour laws, whereas the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) is limited to
enforcing health and safety laws and the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) addresses discrimination in the
workplace.42 Instead of cross-training inspectors or consolidating
agencies, the federal government has moved in the other direction:
not only has the Department of Labor (DOL) further divided its
agencies but also the Government Accountability Office has found a
shockingly low level of interagency referrals.43
This inspector specialization served well in the post-World War II
economy that was marked by the rapidly growing sophistication of
both production and management.44 U.S. inspectors grew specialized

37. See Weil, Compliance with the Minimum Wage, supra note 28, at 2 (“[T]here
are strong reasons to believe that many employers will choose to violate minimum
wage standards when evaluating the benefits and costs of compliance.” (citation
omitted)); see also PIORE & SCHRANK, ROOT-CAUSE REGULATION, supra note 16, at
102 (“[T]he U.S. model is punitive and reactive in nature; it is designed to raise the
costs of — rather than lower the need or desire for — noncompliance . . . .”
(emphasis in original)).
38. See Vosko et al., supra note 32, at 259.
39. See PIORE & SCHRANK, ROOT-CAUSE REGULATION, supra note 16, at 19.
40. States may enact their own wage and hour laws that extend greater protection
to workers than does the FLSA — and many do just that. See Galvin, supra note 13,
at 328–39. For a breakdown of federal agencies, see Piore & Schrank, Toward
Managed Flexibility, supra note 34, at 5.
41. See BOBO supra note 1, at 112–14.
42. See Agencies, U.S. DEP’T LAB., https://www.dol.gov/general/jobs/dol-subagencies [https://perma.cc/B82T-23MP] (last visited Feb. 13, 2021); see also
Overview, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/overview
[https://perma.cc/946W-5PAN] (last visited Feb. 13, 2021).
43. See PIORE & SCHRANK, ROOT-CAUSE REGULATION, supra note 16, at 38–40.
44. See id. at 26.
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in response to advancing technologies on the shop floor and in the
corporate office.45 Under that period’s “Fordist” model of mass
production by large employers,46 inspectors could exploit economies
of scale despite their narrow scope, using one trip to the field to
investigate a large number of workers in a single workplace.47
Additionally, inspectors could rely on these large businesses’
infrastructure to facilitate both inspection and compliance, something
that smaller firms often lack.48 And inspectors grew to depend on a
higher level of employer compliance, developing a “‘symbiotic
relationship’ between managers and regulatory officials.”49
Specialization’s effectiveness, however, was predicated on two
particular facets of the economy that no longer exist: firms’ large size
and the mass industrial unionism that allowed worker representatives
to participate in the enforcement process.50 Beginning in the midtwentieth century, large firms began to disaggregate and the economy
began to “fissure,” creating a host of problems for workplace
compliance.51 This fissuring has radically changed employment
relationships. Aside from an increase in the number of small firms,
employers began to employ — with greater frequency — franchise
networks, supply chains, subcontractors, and other temporary
arrangements to both lower costs and limit liability under labor

45. See id. at 30.
46. See id. at 26. As used by economic historians and labor law scholars,
“Fordism” can be defined as “a system of mass production combining the new
technological innovations of the early twentieth century which accelerated the pace
of manufacture, particularly the assembly line, with a managerial ethos encouraging
greater efficiency in the organization of work.” See Daniel Watson, Fordism: A
Review Essay, 60 LAB. HIST. 144, 145 (2019).
47. See PIORE & SCHRANK, ROOT-CAUSE REGULATION, supra note 16, at 31.
48. See Fine & Gordon, supra note 10, at 555.
49. See PIORE & SCHRANK, ROOT-CAUSE REGULATION, supra note 16, at 30
(quoting Thomas Kochan & Peter Cappelli, The Transformation of the Industrial
Relations and Personnel Function, in INTERNAL LABOR MARKETS 136 (Paul
Osterman, ed., 1984)).
50. See id. at 30–33.
51. See DAVID WEIL, THE FISSURED WORKPLACE: WHY WORK BECAME SO BAD
FOR SO MANY AND WHAT CAN BE DONE TO IMPROVE IT 7–19 (2014) [hereinafter
WEIL, THE FISSURED WORKPLACE] (describing both the changes in the structure of
the workplace over the last four decades — “[l]ike a rock with a fracture that deepens
and spreads with time” — and the ways these changes have negatively affected
workers and our society).
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laws.52 This fissuring has both depressed wages and benefits and
shielded employers from responsibility for workplace abuse.53
In a fissured economy, the U.S. inspectorate model has broken
down quickly. Inspector numbers have plummeted while the number
of workplaces has grown dramatically in the past several decades.54
The rapid growth in both workplaces and classes of covered workers
combined with stagnating inspection resources means that employers
face little chance of being inspected and operated accordingly.55 In
2012, the probability that a U.S. employer would be investigated by
the WHD was a paltry 0.5%.56 Even in the industries most targeted
by inspectors, the probability of inspection still did not reach 1%.57
Despite the hiring of more inspectors during the Obama
Administration, the number of federal wage and hour investigators
remains lower than its number in 1980, despite a 52% increase in the
workforce.58 From 1980 to 2015, the number of wage and hour
violation cases WHD investigated fell by 63%.59
Compared with its peers, the United States is marked by a very low
percentage of inspectors per worker.60 The International Labor
Organization (ILO) has established benchmarks for inspector
capacity: one inspector per 10,000 workers in developed market
economies, one per 20,000 in transition economies, and one per
40,000 in less developed countries.61 As of 2008, the United States
52. See DAVID WEIL, IMPROVING WORKPLACE CONDITIONS THROUGH
STRATEGIC ENFORCEMENT: A REPORT TO THE WAGE AND HOUR DIVISION 9–11
(2010) [hereinafter WEIL, IMPROVING WORKPLACE CONDITIONS].
53. See WEIL, THE FISSURED WORKPLACE, supra note 51, at 268–76; see also Lee
& Smith, supra note 5, at 771–72.
54. Between 1980 and 2007, the number of wage and hour inspectors declined by
31% while the labor force grew by 51%. At the 2009 staffing levels for OSHA, it
would take the agency 133 years to inspect each workplace just once. See ANNETTE
BERNHARDT ET AL., BROKEN LAWS, UNPROTECTED WORKERS: VIOLATIONS OF
EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR LAWS IN AMERICA’S CITIES 52 (2009). By 2014, the WHD
employed 1,100 investigators to cover 135 million workers; in 1948, for example,
1,000 investigators covered 22.6 million workers. See Galvin, supra note 13, at 325.
55. See WEIL, IMPROVING WORKPLACE CONDITIONS, supra note 52, at 5–6.
56. See Galvin, supra note 13, at 327; WEIL, THE FISSURED WORKPLACE, supra
note 51, at 22 (“[T]he annual probability of a workplace receiving an investigation is
well below 1 in 100, and in industries with deep fissuring as tiny as 1 in 1,000.”
(citation omitted)).
57. See Galvin, supra note 13, at 327. For inspection probabilities in common lowwage industries, see WEIL, THE FISSURED WORKPLACE, supra note 51, at 217.
58. See Bittle & Snider, supra note 26, at 126.
59. See COOPER & KROEGER, supra note 5, at 5.
60. See INT’L LAB. OFF., supra note 9, at 70–71.
61. See David Weil, A Strategic Approach to Labour Inspection, 147 INT’L LAB.
REV. 349, 351 (2008) [hereinafter Weil, Labour Inspection].
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had one inspector per 75,000 workers, a ratio similar to Jamaica,
Zambia, and Thailand.62 While troubling in any inspection regime,
deploying insufficient inspectors in a punitive model undermines the
primary deterrent effects that are essential to the model’s operation.63
If, recognizing how few inspectors an agency employs, the employer
knows with reasonable certainty that he likely will not receive an
inspection — let alone a costly punishment — he has little motivation
to incur compliance costs under a traditional cost-benefit analysis.64
For the U.S. punitive model that is predicated on the threat of
inspection and subsequent penalties, this low likelihood of inspection
is fatal.
The mismatch between the U.S. inspection system and the fissured
economy goes beyond simply needing more inspectors to cover more
employers: inspector specialization and division between agencies
leads to severe enforcement gaps.65 Because each inspector has a
narrow purview, the inability of agencies to collaborate and share
information cripples enforcement efforts for “multiple labor law
violators.”66 The consequences can be deadly. For example, in
contrast to most of the world, the United States has decoupled
statutory work hours from industrial hygiene,67 meaning that the
inspector for health and safety conditions does not monitor excessive
work hours. Consequently, the U.S. has failed to adequately enforce
involuntary overtime, which has contributed to serious industrial
accidents like the Upper Big Branch Coal mine explosion that killed
29 miners in 2010.68 Apart from the failure to share information,
agencies rarely engage in joint enforcement against employers who
violate multiple laws, which allows employers to limit their liability to

62. By way of contrast, Chile and Russia had roughly one per 20,000 workers,
Argentina and Brazil one per 25,000, and Germany one per 10,000. See ILO Comm.
on Emp. & Soc. Pol’y, supra note 8. Some scholars, by factoring in state inspectors
and classes of employees covered by state laws, put the number even lower, at one
inspector per 146,000 workers. See ZACH SCHILLER & SARAH DECARLO, POL’Y
MATTERS OHIO, INVESTIGATING WAGE THEFT: A SURVEY OF THE STATES i (2010).
63. See David Weil & Amanda Pyles, Why Complain? Complaints, Compliance,
and the Problem of Enforcement in the U.S. Workplace, 27 COMPAR. LAB. L. &
POL’Y J. 59, 61–62 (2005).
64. See id. For the original enunciation of this theory of corporate compliance
calculations, see Gary Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J.
POL. ECON. 169 (1968).
65. See PIORE & SCHRANK, ROOT-CAUSE REGULATION, supra note 16, at 30–40.
66. See id. at 37–38.
67. See id. at 36–37.
68. See id.
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the specific laws a certain inspector enforces.69 This failure to
coordinate and collaborate is particularly troubling where employers
exploit workers along multiple axes, a common practice.70
In addition to insufficient numbers of inspectors with narrow
mandates that do not effectively collaborate between agencies, de
minimis monetary penalties for labor violations further erode the
inspectorate’s enforcement capacity in the U.S. deterrence regime.71
The maximum civil monetary penalty for a repeated or “willful”
violation for contravention of minimum wage or overtime laws is just
over $2,000.72 Despite these low penalties, WHD inspectors typically
levy them in less than half the cases in which they are entitled.73 By
way of comparison, Australia’s penalty for “[d]eliberate and
systematic contraventions” of workplace laws is $630,000 per incident
for companies and $126,000 for individuals.74 Additionally, the Fair
Labor Standards Act (FLSA) also limits an employee’s recovery to
only two years of back wages — three in the case of willful
violations.75 Of the small number of workers who successfully obtain
monetary awards or judgments, half never actually get collected by
victims.76

69. See id. at 37.
70. See, e.g., BOBO supra note 1, at 173 (quoting the director of a Chicago worker
center: “We almost never see a wage theft case in which there isn’t also some kind of
health and safety problem”); see also PIORE & SCHRANK, ROOT-CAUSE
REGULATION, supra note 16, at 38.
71. See Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace in an Era of SelfRegulation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 319, 359–60 (2005).
72. See 29 C.F.R. § 579.1(a)(2) (2021).
73. See David Weil, Creating a Strategic Enforcement Approach to Address
Wage Theft: One Academic’s Journey in Organizational Change, 60 J. INDUS. REL. 1,
6 (2018) [hereinafter Weil, Approach to Address Wage Theft].
74. See ATT’Y-GEN.’S OFF., AUSTRALIAN GOV’T, IMPROVING PROTECTIONS OF
EMPLOYEES’ WAGES AND ENTITLEMENTS: STRENGTHENING PENALTIES FOR NONCOMPLIANCE
6
(2019),
https://www.ag.gov.au/sites/default/files/202003/strengthening-penalties-for-non-compliance-discussion-paper.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TW4B-FS47].
75. See 29 U.S.C. § 255.
76. See Galvin, supra note 13, at 328; cf. Lee & Smith, supra note 5, at 770 (“As a
result of undercapitalizing their businesses, [employers who engage in wage theft]
may either be judgment proof should a worker want to sue for their unpaid wages, or
they may quickly dissolve their business in the face of a worker’s legal action.”
(citation omitted)). For a discussion of why workers cannot collect on judgments,
such as employer tactics to liquidate and shield assets, see generally CMTY. DEV.
PROJECT AT URB. JUST. CTR., EMP. L. UNI AT LEGAL AID SOC’Y & NAT’L CTR. FOR L.
& ECON. JUST., EMPTY JUDGMENTS: THE WAGE COLLECTION CRISIS IN NEW YORK
(2015).
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Apart from low monetary penalties, WHD inspectors lack the most
punitive tools necessary to enforce the worst actors: suspending or
revoking licenses, closing workplaces, or demanding payment for the
entirety of wages stolen.77 Criminal penalties are available under the
FLSA only after the employer has been convicted once, but they are
capped at six months in jail and $10,000.78 Criminal penalties are
rarely, if ever, invoked.79 Even where licenses are required for
business operation, WHD inspectors do not have the power to
suspend or revoke these licenses.80 In the United States, only OSHA
can close a business; the WHD lacks the independent authority to
order an employer to do anything.81
The United States faces additional obstacles to enforce low-wage
sectors, particularly given the rapid decline of union representation
in, and fissuring of, these industries.82 A high percentage of
immigrants work in the most at-risk industries,83 like nursing homes,
poultry processing plants, and restaurants.84 Immigrants, particularly
those who are undocumented, may be unaware of their rights or
hesitant to invoke them,85 which undermines an inspection system
that depends heavily on worker-initiated complaints.86 And even
77. Outside of the “hot goods” provision as discussed below, WHD inspectors are
limited to recovering employees’ wages, imposing monetary fines, and prohibiting
future employer retaliation. See WEIL, IMPROVING WORKPLACE CONDITIONS, supra
note 52, at 11–14.
78. See 29 U.S.C. § 216.
79. See Galvin, supra note 13, at 328; Jeounghee Kim & Skye Allmang, Wage
Theft in the United States: A Critical Review 11 (Rutgers Sch. of Mgmt. & Lab.
Relations, Working Paper No. 2020-1, 2020) (“Criminal penalties are rarely used,
even though the FLSA makes willful violations a misdemeanor punishable by up to 6
months in jail.” (citation omitted)).
80. See Fine & Gordon, supra note 10, at 562 (“[L]icense revocation must be a
meaningful possibility . . . .”). In the absence of federal-level tools, states and
municipalities have begun to experiment with licensing schemes and other nonmonetary penalties. See Hallett, supra note 2, at 115.
81. See Fine, supra note 33, at 403.
82. See Fine & Gordon, supra note 10, at 560.
83. See id. at 555 (“In 2008, the foreign-born made up about 15 percent of the
U.S. civilian labor force and more than 20 percent of the low-wage workforce.”
(citation omitted)).
84. See id. at 553.
85. See, e.g., id. at 556; Hallett, supra note 2, at 125.
86. Complaint-based investigations comprise 75% of all WHD and 30% of OSHA
investigations. See WEIL, THE FISSURED WORKPLACE, supra note 51, at 247–48; see
also Charlotte S. Alexander & Arthi Prasad, Bottom-Up Workplace Law
Enforcement: An Empirical Analysis, 89 IND. L.J. 1069, 1070 (2014) (“[P]rivate
lawsuits vastly outnumber government enforcement actions against law-breaking
employers . . . . [G]overnment agencies depend in large part on worker complaints to
direct their enforcement activity.” (citations omitted)).
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where the employee knows her rights, employers often use
sophisticated techniques to obfuscate labor law violations, especially
wage theft.87 Small firms with fewer than 20 employees predominate
the low-wage sector, which is the hardest-to-police sector with the
hardest-to-protect workers.88 The explosive growth of smaller firms
in low-wage settings not only correlates to higher violation rates but
also undermines the traditional inspectorate design predicated on
efficiencies of scale.89 Additionally, low-wage industries feature a
high use of subcontracting networks, often in supply chains that allow
lead firms to further evade liability under the FLSA and other labor
laws.90
The combination of declining numbers of inspectors to enforce
more workers and worksites, narrow inspector purview, and miniscule
penalties imposed and recovered has proven profoundly ineffective in
enforcing labor laws in this fissured economy, particularly for lowwage workers.91 Exactly how to remedy the problem, however, is the
subject of significant scholarly debate.
II. CHANGING THE EQUATION: MAKING WAGE THEFT
MORE EXPENSIVE

In studying noncompliance with minimum wage laws, economists
have long sought to quantify employers’ rational determination to pay
sub-minimum wage rates. In their seminal 1979 article, Orley
Ashenfelter and Robert Smith established a formula that scholars
continue to use to measure both the costs and benefits an employer
expects from noncompliance.92 To simplify a complicated equation,

87. See ESTLUND, supra note 19, at 62–63 (describing tactics like forcing workers
to arrive 15 minutes early, refusing to pay for preparatory work, and misclassification
of workers as independent contractors, which workers may not detect easily).
88. See Fine & Gordon, supra note 10, at 554–55.
89. See id. at 555.
90. See id.; see also WEIL, IMPROVING WORKPLACE CONDITIONS, supra note 52, at
9–10. “Lead firms” have shed many of the activities and services that formerly were
accomplished by employees and instead have sought to meet these needs through
sub-contractors, causing a host of ripple effects for both working conditions and labor
law enforcement. See id. at 9–10. “Lead [f]irms” are “firms at the top of the industry
structure.” See id. at 79.
91. See WEIL, IMPROVING WORKPLACE CONDITIONS, supra note 52, at 1.
92. See Orley Ashenfelter & Robert S. Smith, Compliance with the Minimum
Wage Law, 87 J. POL. ECON. 333, 335–36 (1979). This equation includes the
traditional, quantifiable economic considerations of a profit-maximizing employer.
See id. There may be other “soft” costs associated with noncompliance, such as loss
of good will or reputational risks. See, e.g., Matthew S. Johnson, Regulation by

Shaming: Deterrence Effects of Publicizing Violations of Workplace Safety and
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the benefits are the difference between actual pay and legal wage
rates, and the costs are calculated by multiplying the probability of
detection by the amount of expected damages if an employer is
caught.93 Under this economic analysis, “employers will not comply
with the law if the expected penalties are small either because it is
easy to escape detection or because assessed penalties are small.”94
So, to increase employer compliance with wage and hour laws, an
effective remedy must make wage theft more expensive — raising the
cost of noncompliance — by significantly increasing the likelihood of
getting caught, elevating penalties substantially, or both.
A. Raising Noncompliance Costs: Increasing the
Likelihood of Getting Caught

Beyond the obvious step of hiring many more inspectors, scholars
have proposed several approaches to increase the likelihood of
catching employers.95 At the risk of oversimplification, two primary
approaches can be classified as (1) deploying existing inspectorate
resources more effectively and efficiently, like targeting particular
industries or using a wider array of pedagogical and punitive tools;96

Health Laws, 110 AM. ECON. REV. 1866 (2020) (discussing the use of shaming
strategies by OSHA to improve health and safety compliance); see also Sharon
Yadin, Regulatory Shaming, 49 ENV’T L. 407, 441 (2019) (“Research shows that
corporations are threatened and motivated not only by the risk of classic legal
penalties but also by informal social and economic sanctions, stemming from negative
publicity.” (citation omitted)); Lee & Smith, supra note 5, at 812–13 (“[E]mployers
[whose business model is built on wage theft] may be more likely deterred if there is a
credible threat of severe penalties, such as having their business shut down or facing
criminal charges.”).
93. See Ashenfelter & Smith, supra note 92, at 335–36; see also Hallett, supra
note 2, at 103; Galvin, supra note 13, at 327.
94. See Ashenfelter & Smith, supra note 92, at 336.
95. Scholars and advocates have proposed a variety of private solutions outside
reforming public inspectorates. For an overview of corporate codes of responsibility,
see generally James J. Brudney, Envisioning Enforcement of Freedom of Association
Standards in Corporate Codes: A Journey for Sinbad or Sisyphus?, 33 COMPAR. LAB.
L. & POL’Y J. 555 (2012). Worker-driven social responsibility, another private regime
that does not rely on public inspectorates, is a compliance system developed and
implemented by workers. See WORKER-DRIVEN SOC. RESP. NETWORK, FACT-SHEET:
WHAT IS WORKER-DRIVEN SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY (WSR)? (2017), https://wsrnetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/What_is_WSR_web.pdf
[https://perma.cc/K4AY-BL9A]. Worker groups also engage in strategies alongside or
outside of government enforcement. See Lee & Smith, supra note 5, at 819.
96. Michael Piore and Andrew Schrank argue for a “root-cause regulation” that
allows the inspector to use wide discretion and breadth of vision to develop creative
solutions that fit within changing business structures, all under a mechanism to
manage discretion to avoid undesirable outcomes like bribes or unpredictable
regulation. See PIORE & SCHRANK, ROOT-CAUSE REGULATION, supra note 16, at 12.
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and (2) multiplying inspector capacity by partnering with worker
groups and other third-party actors.97
Deploying existing inspector resources more effectively must be a
primary concern of repairing the enforcement gap, especially in a
fissured economy. Scholars have coalesced around a multi-pronged
strategy dubbed “strategic enforcement,” which encourages using a
broader range of inspector tools in collaboration with third parties.98
Instead of relying on complaints and interventions against isolated
employers, strategic enforcement uses data to prioritize target
industries and employers.99 With these targets, inspectors work
closely with key third parties — not just worker groups but anyone
with influence over the employer or industry — to brainstorm

Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite describe a “responsive regulation” in which the
inspectorate adapts to industry conduct and structure in both form and degrees,
escalating interventions through an enforcement period that begins with persuasion
and ends with license revocation. See IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE
REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 4, 35 (1992). David Weil
proposes “strategic enforcement” in which inspectors move away from a reactive,
complaint-based model and toward proactive steps that engage more with networks
of employees in order to craft a particular industry structure. See generally Weil,
Labour Inspection, supra note 61. Similarly, the ILO proposes a “strategic
compliance” model, in which proactive, targeted, and tailored interventions engage
multiple stakeholders to help inspectorates maximize their limited resources in an
ever-evolving world of work. See ILO Approach to Strategic Compliance Planning
for Labour Inspectorates, INT’L LAB. ORG. [hereinafter ILO Approach],
https://www.ilo.org/global/topics/labour-administration-inspection/resourceslibrary/training/strategic-compliance/lang—en/index.htm
[https://perma.cc/8RCMLLT8] (last visited Oct. 21, 2021).
97. See, e.g., ESTLUND, supra note 19 (arguing for co-regulation as a way of
integrating worker groups into self-regulation movements); Andrew Elmore,
Collaborative Enforcement, 10 NE. U.L. REV. 72 (2018) (advocating for publicprivate regulatory experimentation); Fine, supra note 8 (elaborating on traditional
cooperation between inspectors and public interest organizations). Collaboration
with worker groups, while not common the United States, is a feature of other
countries’ enforcement strategies. See, e.g., INT’L LAB. ORG., LABOUR
ADMINISTRATION AND LABOUR INSPECTION, supra note 9, at 66–68 (reviewing
country examples from Spain, South Africa, and Laos, among others).
98. See generally WEIL, IMPROVING WORKPLACE CONDITIONS, supra note 52; see
also Eric Tucker et al., Carrying Little Sticks: Is There a ‘Deterrence Gap’ in
Employment Standards Enforcement in Ontario, Canada?, 35 INT’L J. COMPAR. LAB.
L. 1, 5 (2019). This strategy is also called “strategic compliance” on the international
stage, especially by the ILO. See ILO Approach, supra note 96.
99. See Weil, Labour Inspection, supra note 61, at 372; see also Int’l Labour
Conference, Application of International Labour Standards 2020: Report of the
Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions & Recommendations, 461–
62, ILC.109/III(A) (2020) (ILO).
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creative responses to noncompliance.100 In this model, inspectors
seek to deploy stiff penalties on top-level violators to create
downward deterrence throughout an entire industry.101
In the most successful U.S. example of strategic enforcement, the
WHD’s use of the FLSA “hot cargo” or “hot goods” provision in the
apparel industry shows how strategic enforcement can penetrate a
supply chain and drive labor law compliance that benefits workers at
the bottom of the chain.102 Employing this long-ignored statutory
provision in the apparel industry, the WHD embargoes apparel goods
that are found to have been manufactured in violation of the FLSA.103
The WHD refuses to release the embargoed goods unless the
manufacturer agrees to create a compliance program with its
subcontractors, including a monitoring system operated by the
manufacturer.104 Given the rapid turnaround expected by retailers,
these embargo delays significantly raise the compliance costs for
retailers and their manufacturers through lost shipments and lost
contracts.105 Under the specter of these elevated costs, top-level firms
are forced to collaborate with the WHD to ensure that their suppliers
comply with the law.106 This example represents a novel tactic for an
agency that has historically shied away from a coordinated approach
and industry-specific training for inspectors.107 Unfortunately, the
DOL under the Obama Administration ran into fierce opposition
when deploying the provision in the agricultural industry.108

100. See ILO Approach, supra note 96, at 7 (These third parties “can wield
influences that are more powerful and more sustainable than those of the labour
inspectorate to combat particular compliance issues for specific targets.”).
101. See Tucker et al., supra note 98, at 5–6; see also WEIL, THE FISSURED
WORKPLACE, supra note 51, at 222.
102. See Weil, Labour Inspection, supra note 61, at 370; see also Tess Hardy, Who
Should Be Held Liable for Workplace Contraventions and on What Basis?, 29
AUSTRALIAN J. LAB. L. 78, 99 (2016).
103. See 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(1); see also WEIL, THE FISSURED WORKPLACE, supra
note 51, at 227 (“[The ‘hot goods’ provision] allows the Labor Department to enjoin
the transportation, shipment, delivery, or sale across state lines of goods that have
been produced by any employee who has not been paid the minimum wage or
overtime compensation as required by the FLSA.”).
104. See Weil, Labour Inspection, supra note 61, at 370.
105. See id.
106. See WEIL, IMPROVING WORKPLACE CONDITIONS, supra note 52, at 29–30; see
also Hardy, supra note 102, at 100.
107. See Weil, Approach to Address Wage Theft, supra note 73, at 7.
108. The U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon held that use of the “hot
goods” provision was economically coercive where the products were perishable
produce. See Perez v. Pan-Am. Berry Growers, LLC, 6:12-cv-1474-TC, 2014 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 5602, at *14–18 (D. Or. Jan. 15, 2014), report and recommendation
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In addition to increasing inspector efficiency through strategic
enforcement, academics have emphasized how sustained
collaboration between inspectors and worker groups can multiply
inspector capacity and increase enforcement effectiveness,
particularly in the hardest-to-reach industries.109 Janice Fine and
Jennifer Gordon describe a model relationship in which worker
groups directly facilitate inspectors’ work within their industries.110 In
such a partnership, worker groups can do outreach to employees to
detect violations and file complaints, and they can identify leverage
points against target employers to help inspectors fashion proactive
strategies.111 Fine and Gordon emphasize the need for partnerships
to be “formalized,” “sustained,” and “vigorous” — that, in order for
them to function effectively, partnerships must not be ad hoc,
temporary, or mere window dressings.112 Importantly, to ensure a
formal, continuing relationship and to enable worker group
participation, the government must fund the project adequately.113
This model has borne fruit in both industry-specific and
geographically-limited contexts, even with non-union worker
groups.114 One particularly successful example is the collaboration
between an industry-specific inspectorate — the Janitorial
Enforcement Team (JET) of the California Division of Labor
Standards Enforcement — and the Maintenance Cooperation Trust
Fund (MCTF), a janitorial watchdog organization founded by a

adopted, No. 6:12-cv-1474-TC, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56989 (D. Or. Apr. 24, 2014);
see also Abbie Fentress Swanson, ‘Hot’ Oregon Blueberry Fight Prompts Farm Bill
Changes,
NPR
(Apr.
3,
2014,
11:15
AM),
https://www.npr.org/sections/thesalt/2014/04/03/298537746/hot-oregon-blueberryfight-prompts-farm-bill-changes [https://perma.cc/7YD3-2857]. For more on the
opposition the DOL has faced in using this provision, see generally Stephanie A.
Koltookian, Some (Don’t) Like It Hot: The Use of the “Hot Goods” Injunction in
Perishable Agriculture, 100 IOWA L. REV. 1841 (2015).
109. See supra note 97.
110. See Fine & Gordon, supra note 10, at 560–63 (describing the role of worker
groups not as between employers and regulators but as facilitating the inspectors’
work by designing proactive strategies, facilitating worker complaints, and more).
111. See id. at 561–62; see also BOBO, supra note 1, at 125–27 (citing successes like
$1.3 million in back wages collected in Houston and $1.2 million in back wages
secured in Las Vegas through complaint programs developed between worker groups
and the DOL).
112. See Fine & Gordon, supra note 10, at 561.
113. See ESTLUND, supra note 19, at 120 (“Formal monitoring requires staff and
money, which are in short supply among many worker organizations other than
unions . . . .”); see also Fine & Gordon, supra note 10, at 561.
114. For an overview of different “tripartism” strategies, see Fine, supra note 8, at
823–26.
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Service Employees International Union local.115 The MCTF, whose
inspectors were longtime janitors, quadrupled the investigative
capacity of the JET and provided state inspectors with critical
industry knowledge.116 In assisting JET to assemble the information
necessary to bring cases, MCTF inspectors knew to visit worksites at
night (when janitors worked) and how to systematically reconstruct
what workers should have been paid through detailed interviews with
workers, a skill that state JET inspectors lacked.117 This partnership,
according to state officials, encouraged JET inspectors to prioritize
investigations begun by the MCTF and prompted agency attorneys to
take a more aggressive posture.118 In four years, the partnership
helped create administrative, civil, and criminal actions against bad
actor employers that resulted in more than $38 million in back pay for
janitors.119
The strategies outlined above provide ways for the inspectorate to
make the best use of its limited resources. The scholars advocating
for these tactics, however, offer them not as a substitute for drastically
increasing inspector numbers but as a small bandage on a much
bigger wound.120 Without such an increase in the inspectorate, these
strategies on their own will not sufficiently increase the likelihood of
employers getting caught. During the 1970s, when numbers of WHD
inspectors were at their highest,121 minimum wage compliance was

115. See Fine & Gordon, supra note 10, at 566. The MCTF is a partnership
between “law-abiding contractors” and the California janitors’ union, SEIU Local
1877, that seeks to “combat the underground economy, level the playing field, and
protect
workers.”
See Our History, MAINT. COOP. TR. FUND,
http://www.janitorialwatch.org/history/ [https://perma.cc/GL7C-4V4G] (last visited
Dec. 9, 2020).
116. See Fine & Gordon, supra note 10, at 566; see also ESTLUND, supra note 19, at
117–20.
117. See Fine & Gordon, supra note 10, at 566–67; see also MATTHEW AMENGUAL,
POLITICIZED ENFORCEMENT IN ARGENTINA: LABOR AND ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATION 228 (2016).
118. See Fine & Gordon, supra note 10, at 567.
119. See id.
120. See WEIL, IMPROVING WORKPLACE CONDITIONS, supra note 52, at 5 (“The
fundamental challenge facing the WHD and most workplace regulatory agencies
arises from limitations in resources available to them relative to the size and scope of
U.S. workplaces covered by relevant statutes.”); see also Fine & Gordon, supra note
10, at 576 (“The bottom line is that marginal increases in the wage and hour
inspectorate alone will be insufficient to solve the problem.”).
121. During the Carter Administration, the DOL had 1,600 wage and hour
inspectors. President Reagan cut the number to 700. See Lora Jo Foo, The

Vulnerable and Exploitable Immigrant Workforce and the Need for Strengthening
Worker Protective Legislation, 103 YALE L.J. 2179, 2204 (1994).
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still estimated at 69%.122 To return to that level of inspection, the
U.S. DOL would need to more than double the number of inspectors
it deploys.123 The above interventions certainly allow inspectors to be
more effective with existing resources; but to really impact employers’
compliance calculations by significantly increasing the likelihood of
getting caught, Congress must commit to funding and staffing the
inspectorate at remarkable levels. Without such congressional action,
the other way to impact the compliance equation is to drastically
increase penalties.124
B. Raising Noncompliance Costs: Increasing Penalties

Apart from not reaching enough employers, inspectors do not have
the tools to hold them accountable when they catch them violating
the law. At the federal level, fines remain appallingly low, around
$2,000 per violation.125 Alongside this amount, the WHD has
historically levied civil money penalties in less than half of the cases in
which they were entitled to do so.126 Typically, the worst that an
employer can expect for a wage theft violation is to pay the bare
amount of the wages owed to an employee within the three-year
statute of limitations.127 Because of its limited resources, the DOL
“routinely settles cases on workers’ behalf for pennies on the
dollar.”128 Additionally, the DOL lacks the capacity to revoke
business licenses or seek the full amount of back wages beyond three
years.129 And while criminal penalties are available for “willful” and

122. See Ashenfelter & Smith, supra note 92, at 343.
123. The number of inspectors increased to over one thousand during the Obama
Administration, but “[o]n a per capita basis, the U.S. DOL would need 2,232
investigators to have the same enforcement power as it did in 1975.” Hallett, supra
note 2, at 122 (citation omitted).
124. See id. at 113 (“[T]hese two factors — enforcement and penalties — must be
thought of in relation to each other . . . . If enforcement rates are very low then
penalties must be very severe to reach the same result.”).
125. Civil monetary penalties are only available for repeat or willful violators of
minimum wage and overtime laws, and in 2021, the penalty is $2,074. See 29 C.F.R. §
578.3(a) (2021). The amount is adjusted annually for inflation. See Civil Money
Penalty Inflation Adjustments, supra note 14.
126. See WEIL, IMPROVING WORKPLACE CONDITIONS, supra note 52, at 14; see also
Galvin, supra note 13, at 328 (“Civil or criminal penalties are rare . . . .”).
127. See NAT’L EMP. L. PROJECT, supra note 28, at 17; see also Hallett, supra note
2, at 109.
128. Hallett, supra note 2, at 109.
129. See Fine & Gordon, supra note 10, at 562 (calling for license revocation and
extension or abolishment of statutes of limitation).
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repeat offenders,130 there is little evidence they are invoked by
inspectors.131
In an ideal world, Congress would not only substantially increase
the number of inspectors but also grant inspectors the tools that
would allow them to hold accountable bad actor employers.
Recognizing the unlikelihood of worker-friendly federal-level change,
workers’ rights advocates have spent the last decade driving state and
municipal reforms to increase the tools available to state-level
inspectors, advocates, and workers.132 These reforms range from
extending the statute of limitations and granting workers private
rights of action to authorizing treble damages, much higher monetary
fines, and criminal penalties.133 Scholarly analysis demonstrates that
the laws that “most dramatically increased punitive damages saw the
greatest declines in the incidence of minimum wage violations.”134
While state-level efforts provide real, important benefits to workers
in those jurisdictions, they do not address the federal-level failures
that affect workers nationwide.
Even absent sweeping federal change, however, tools to increase
penalties for employer noncompliance are available throughout the
country — but not to labor inspectors. Prosecutors at state and
municipal levels have access to the most punitive tools that federal
inspectors lack: arrest, threats of jail time, seizing assets, barring
employer access to government contracting, and more.135 They can
pursue violations under not only labor laws but also other civil and
criminal statutes that affect workers, like intentional misclassification,
failure to obtain workers’ compensation insurance, health and safety
violations, insurance fraud, financial crimes, and other creative
approaches.136
Some scholars and advocates in the United States have argued that
AGs and DAs can help fill a portion of the enforcement gap,
particularly regarding the epidemic of wage theft.137 Scholars

130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

See 29 U.S.C. § 216(a).
See Galvin, supra note 13, at 328.
See Lee & Smith, supra note 5, at 761.
See id. at 776.
Galvin, supra note 13, at 326.
See discussion infra Section II.C.
See Terri Gerstein & David Seligman, A Response to “Rethinking Wage
Theft Criminalization,” ONLABOR (Apr. 20, 2018), http://www.onlabor.org/aresponse-to-rethinking-wage-theft-criminalization [https://perma.cc/Z9Z8-EWAU].
137. See, e.g., Jane R. Flanagan, Alt-Enforcers: The Emergence of State Attorneys
General as Workplace Rights Enforcers, 95 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 103, 108 (2020)
(“[T]raditional wage enforcement agencies, namely state departments of labor and
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typically approach the intervention of DAs and AGs from a place of
resource deprivation: where the number of inspectors to workers
remains perilously low, any other help looks good.138 In that analysis,
AGs and DAs are complementary to labor inspectorates139 or
“alternative or supplemental workplace rights enforcers.”140 These
prosecutors cannot replace inspectors and their power to make
routine inspections, use non-punitive strategies to encourage
employer compliance, or take primary ownership over labor law
enforcement.141
But until federal inspectors are plentiful enough and possess the
high-level tools necessary to hold employers accountable, AGs and
DAs should be understood not merely as complementary but rather
as necessary in our current inspector framework — without requiring
any further legislative action.142 Where, at the federal level, both the
likelihood of inspection and punishment for contravention of labor
laws remain painfully low, the tools wielded by AGs and DAs can
shift that equation for scofflaw employers. With their broad purview
to prosecute crimes143 and a host of effective tools at their disposal,
AGs and DAs in a variety of jurisdictions have shown that they can
hold bad actor employers accountable.144

the U.S. Department of Labor, do not have the resources to adequately enforce
employment laws.”); Gerstein & Seligman, supra note 136 (arguing that criminal
prosecutions of wage theft, in particular, can address a scope of violations outside the
purview of one single inspector in the U.S. context); TERRI GERSTEIN & MARNI VON
WILPERT, ECON. POL’Y INST., STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL CAN PLAY KEY ROLES IN
PROTECTING WORKERS’ RIGHTS 3 (2018) (arguing that, as distinct from other
government agencies, state AGs have “a range of potential tools”).
138. See Flanagan, supra note 137, at 108 (arguing for the intervention of state
attorneys general given the under-resourced nature of labor agencies: “On the state
level, one recent study estimated that there is one state investigator for every 146,000
workers in the United States . . . . [And] an estimated one [federal] investigator for
every 135,000 workers” (internal citations omitted)).
139. See TERRI GERSTEIN, ECON. POL’Y INST., WORKERS’ RIGHTS PROTECTION
AND ENFORCEMENT BY STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL 4 (2020) [hereinafter
GERSTEIN, WORKERS’ RIGHTS].
140. See, e.g., Flanagan, supra note 137, at 103 (describing the general
discretionary authority of the New York State Attorney General).
141. See GERSTEIN, WORKERS’ RIGHTS, supra note 139, at 3.
142. This Note does not posit that such reforms of the federal inspectorate are
impossible; if such reforms are implemented, AGs and DAs arguably would not be as
necessary to hold bad actor employers accountable.
143. See Flanagan, supra note 137, at 111.
144. For a full list of recent attorney general interventions into labor law
enforcement, see GERSTEIN, WORKERS’ RIGHTS, supra note 139, at 5. For a review of
district attorney actions, see infra Section II.C.
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C. How DAs and AGs Have Increased Enforcement of
Labor Laws

In the last 15 years, state AGs have begun to enforce labor laws.145
As of 2020, eight states and Washington, D.C. have dedicated
workers’ rights units within AG offices, six of which were initiated in
the last five years.146 While many units exercise existing legal
authority, in several states, legislatures have granted AGs general
jurisdiction to protect workers, often concurrent with state
departments of labor.147 These AGs have brought cases to protect
workers across a range of abuses: from wage theft and health and
safety violations to employee misclassification and sexual
harassment.148 They have pursued both large national corporations
and small employers in the underground economy.149 Some AG
offices have institutionalized relationships with community and
worker organizations.150
State AGs play a complementary role to state labor departments,
which are the primary enforcement body for state labor laws.151
While labor departments employ investigators and have jurisdiction
to enter and inspect workplaces, AG lawyers have the power to issue
subpoenas and file lawsuits with a strategic focus.152 Most states allow
AGs to bring both civil and criminal suits.153 To pursue wage theft
violations, state AGs have achieved significant results for workers
using both civil and criminal prosecutions. For example, in 2019, New
York AG James secured $450,000 for 100 home health aides who had
been cheated out of wages and unlawfully threatened with
deportation for complaining.154 In 2020, Washington, D.C. AG
Racine secured $500,000 in payments from two employers who stole

145. See generally GERSTEIN & VON WILPERT, supra note 137.
146. See GERSTEIN, WORKERS’ RIGHTS, supra note 139, at 4.
147. See id.
148. For a list of AG employment-related actions, separated by type and state, see
generally id.
149. See GERSTEIN & VON WILPERT, supra note 137, at 4–7.
150. See Flanagan, supra note 137, at 116–21. For examples of these partnerships,
see discussion infra Section III.B.
151. For a comprehensive review of AG intervention by state and labor law area,
see GERSTEIN, WORKERS’ RIGHTS, supra note 139, at 3.
152. See id. at 3–4.
153. See id. at 15.
154. See Press Release, N.Y. Att’y Gen., Attorney General James Secures $450,000
for 100 Home Health Aides Threatened with Deportation (Sept. 13, 2019),
https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/2019/attorney-general-james-secures-450000-100home-health-aides-threatened [https://perma.cc/R3UE-S8XV].
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from drywall workers and home healthcare workers.155 In Fiscal Year
2020, Massachusetts AG Healey secured more than $12.3 million in
restitution and penalties against employers who violated wage and
hour laws, covering nearly 13,000 impacted employees.156
District attorneys have also entered the labor law enforcement
space. The most prominent examples are the Manhattan DA and the
Alameda County DA.157 Recently, the Queens DA and Boulder DA
have also formed offices dedicated to workers’ rights,158 and varied
municipalities have begun to prosecute wage theft. Philadelphia
recently created the Economic Crimes Unit to investigate and
prosecute crimes against workers, hiring an experienced labor
attorney to run the unit.159 El Paso, Texas, created a wage theft task
force in 2011, which includes the police department, county DAs, and
a grassroots workers’ rights non-profit.160 Taking advantage of
legislation that closed a loophole that had allowed employers to avoid
prosecution by paying a small amount of wages owed to a worker, the
El Paso DA brought charges against an employer who refused to pay
the entire $2,295 he owed to an employee.161 The employer was

155. See Justin Wm. Moyer, Two D.C. Employers to Pay Almost $500,000 in Wage
Cases,
WASH.
POST
(Jan.
2,
2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/two-dc-employers-to-payalmost-500000-in-wage-theft-cases/2020/01/02/9aa3e168-2d7c-11ea-9b60817cc18cf173_story.html [https://perma.cc/JAS2-ABFQ].
156. See OFF. OF MASS. ATT‘Y MAURA HEALEY, LABOR DAY REPORT 2020:
PROTECTING MASSACHUSETTS WORKERS 3–4 (2020) [hereinafter LABOR DAY
REPORT
2020],
https://www.mass.gov/doc/ags-labor-day-report-2020/download
[https://perma.cc/J2VN-8K3J].
157. See infra notes 163–83 and discussion.
158. See Press Release, Queens Dist. Att’y, Queens Contractor and His Business
Plead Guilty to Violating Prevailing Wage Labor Laws and Stealing More than $1.5
Million from Workers (Sept. 22, 2020); Human Rights Ordinance, CITY BOULDER,
https://bouldercolorado.gov/services/human-rights-ordinance [https://perma.cc/Z36GY3CX] (last visited Nov. 7, 2020).
159. See Press Release, Phila. Dist. Att’y’s Off., District Attorney Krasner
Announces New Labor Liaison to Bolster Protections for Workers (Oct. 8, 2019),
https://medium.com/philadelphia-justice/release-district-attorney-krasner-announcesnew-labor-liaison-to-bolster-protections-for-workers-62159359ddca
[https://perma.cc/9QKX-EGEC].
160. See Priscila Mosqueda, El Paso Becomes Second City to Indict Employer for
Wage
Theft,
TEX.
OBSERVER
(Apr.
26,
2013,
4:04
PM),
https://www.texasobserver.org/el-paso-becomes-second-city-to-indict-employer-forwage-theft/ [https://perma.cc/98GV-3PZ4]. For a description of the Labor Justice
Committee/Comité de Justicia Laboral, see About, LAB. JUST. COMM.,
https://laborjusticecommittee.wordpress.com/about/
[https://perma.cc/2YWQVYRM] (last visited Nov. 5, 2020).
161. See Scott Braddock, First Reported Conviction Under Texas’ New Wage
Theft
Law,
CONSTR.
CITIZEN
(Sept.
16,
2015),
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convicted in 2015 and sentenced to a suspended prison sentence, a
$5,000 fine, and full restitution to the employee.162 In 2019, after
Colorado enacted an anti-wage theft statute,163 the Boulder County
DA negotiated a plea deal with an employer who repeatedly stole
undocumented workers’ wages and then threatened to report them to
immigration authorities.164 In exchange for a suspended sentence, the
employer agreed to pay restitution to the workers or else serve up to
three years in prison.165 These cases highlight two important facets of
DA prosecutions: they can successfully prosecute small employers
who blatantly violate the law, and they can obtain restitution for
workers merely by threatening jail time — and avoid the collections
challenges facing civil plaintiffs and inspectors alike in recovering
from employers.166
The Alameda County DA has demonstrated how prosecutors can
avoid these collection problems to ensure workers receive restitution.
In one large wage theft case, 56 restaurant workers toiled 11 to 12
hours per day, six days per week, for as little as $2 per hour with no
overtime premium.167 The two defendant restauranteurs, upon
hearing of the lawsuit, promptly shuttered the businesses and
registered new companies under different owners to avoid paying
their workers.168 The DA, however, successfully seized $1.7 million of

https://constructioncitizen.com/blog/first-reported-conviction-under-texas-new-wagetheft-law/1509161 [https://perma.cc/V3TF-BZV3].
162. See id.
163. See Colorado Wage Act, COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-4-101 (2019).
164. See Mitchell Byars, Boulder Man Sentenced for Threatening Undocumented
Workers,
DENVER
POST
(Nov.
12,
2019,
9:34
PM),
https://www.denverpost.com/2019/11/12/boulder-man-sentenced-for-threateningundocumented-workers/ [https://perma.cc/7NW5-LXCC].
165. See id.
166. Even if employees win their civil case, collecting on the judgment can be very
challenging or impossible. See Chris Fuchs, Wage Theft Cases Can Be Easy to Win.
Collecting Is a Different Story, NBC NEWS (June 19, 2019, 1:15 PM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/asian-america/wage-theft-cases-can-be-easy-wincollecting-different-story-n1018306 [https://perma.cc/274J-9BW3]; see also Hallett,
supra note 2, at 110–12. For stories of tactics that employers use to avoid paying
workers even when civil judgments are issued against them (like declaring
bankruptcy or transferring assets to a family member), see generally CMTY. DEV.
PROJECT AT URB. JUST. CTR. ET AL., supra note 76.
167. See Pres Release, Off. of the Alameda Cnty. Dist. Att’y., $1.7 Million in
Assets Seized after Restaurant Owners Are Sentenced (Jan. 10, 2019) [hereinafter
Alameda
Cnty.
Press
Release],
https://www.alcoda.org/newsroom/2019/jan/17_million_in_
assets_seized_after_restaurant_owner [https://perma.cc/XCD6-P9JU].
168. See Ashley McBride, Two Bay Area Restaurant Owners Ordered to Pay
More Than $1 Million to Cheated Workers, S.F. CHRON. (Jan. 13, 2019, 5:31 PM),
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assets and ultimately distributed more than $1 million to the workers
and the rest to fines and penalties.169 Notably, despite felony
convictions, these defendants avoided jail time by paying the entire
amount owed to workers.170
The Manhattan DA has focused on prosecuting employers who use
wage theft schemes among a suite of illegal practices, largely in the
construction industry.171 In 2015, an undocumented Ecuadorean
construction worker, Carlos Moncayo, was fatally interred when unreinforced excavation walls collapsed at his Manhattan worksite.172
The general contractor was convicted at trial of manslaughter,
criminally-negligent homicide, and reckless endangerment for the
worker’s death.173 The maximum fine for an employer in this
situation is a mere $10,000174 — an insignificant amount for both a
large company and a worker’s death.175 In the course of its homicide
investigation, however, the DA discovered that one of the contractors
routinely failed to pay overtime to its employees in addition to
misclassifying employees to lower his workers’ compensation

https://www.sfchronicle.com/crime/article/Two-Bay-Area-restaurant-owners-mustpay-1-7-13524870.php [https://perma.cc/52CR-AWXJ].
169. See Alameda Cnty. Press Release, supra note 167.
170. See id.
171. See Our Work: Construction & Development, MANHATTAN DIST. ATT’Y’S
OFF.,
https://www.manhattanda.org/our-work/construction-development/
[https://perma.cc/K5FC-WD2V] (last visited Nov. 3, 2020).
172. See David W. Chen, Manslaughter Charges for Construction Managers After
Queens Worker Dies in Pit Collapse, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 5, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/06/nyregion/construction-managers-to-facemanslaughter-charges-in-death-of-queens-worker.html
[https://perma.cc/T9SW3CBD].
173. See John Riley, Contractor Fined $10,000 in Cave-In Death of Carlos
Moncayo, NEWSDAY (Dec. 20, 2016), https://www.newsday.com/news/newyork/contractor-fined-10-000-in-cave-in-death-of-carlos-moncayo-1.12783179
[https://perma.cc/737S-MNMB]; see also Trevor Kapp & Danielle Tcholakian,
Supervisor Convicted in Worker’s Death Sentenced to Up to 3 Years in Prison,
DNAINFO
(Dec.
15,
2016,
2:06
PM),
https://www.dnainfo.com/newyork/20161215/meatpacking-district/supervisor-convicted-death-prison-wilmer-cuevacarlos-moncayo/ [https://perma.cc/8BY5-5A3W].
174. See Corinne Ramey, Construction Company Convicted of Manslaughter
Fined
$10,000,
WALL
ST.
J.
(Dec.
20,
2016,
3:34
PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/construction-company-convicted-of-manslaughter-fined10-000-1482265875 [https://perma.cc/493K-F4XV].
175. Similarly, the average fine that OSHA issued in a fatality case in 2018 was
$25,178. See CHARLENE OBERNAUER, N.Y. COMM. FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY &
HEALTH, DEADLY SKYLINE: AN ANNUAL REPORT ON CONSTRUCTION FATALITIES IN
NEW YORK STATE 8 (2020), https://nycosh.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/2020Deadly-Skyline-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/FYD7-NT3K].
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insurance payments.176 By securing guilty pleas for the wage theft and
insurance fraud violations, the DA successfully obtained full
restitution of $500,000 stolen from workers.177 The DA’s recognition
that the same employers who expose workers to fatal health and
safety conditions also routinely steal their wages and engage in tax
and workers’ compensation fraud led to the formation of the
Construction Fraud Task Force.178 Housed in the Rackets Bureau,
which historically has prosecuted organized crime,179 the Task Force
brings together different government agencies to identify and
prosecute corruption in the construction industry that affects workers
and the general public alike.180
The Construction Fraud Task Force also organized the Wage Theft
Initiative, a collaborative effort of DAs in New York City and
surrounding counties as well as the New York City Comptroller, the
New York State Department of Labor, and the New York State
AG.181 From 2015 through 2017, the Wage Theft Initiative recovered
more than $2.5 million in stolen wages for more than 400 workers.182
District attorneys in New York City and neighboring counties have
pursued wage theft by prosecuting employers under charges of grand
larceny, offering a false instrument, criminal possession of stolen
property, fraudulent schemes, and failure to pay prevailing wages.183
Considering the scope of the enforcement gap, these interventions
are minor in scale but important in practice: they exemplify how state
and local prosecutors have used their powerful tools to enforce labor

176. See Michael Sachs, Chief of the Investigation Div. & Diana Florence, Att’yin-Charge of the Constr. Fraud Task Force, New York County District Attorney’s
Office Testimony before City Council Committee on the Justice System (Apr. 16,
2018),
https://www.manhattanda.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/4.16.18-WageTheft-City-Council-Hearing-Written-submission-.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CZ695TWH].
177. See id.
178. See id.
179. See About the Office: Bureaus and Units, MANHATTAN DIST. ATT’Y’S OFF,
https://www.manhattanda.org/about-the-office/bureaus-and-units/
[https://perma.cc/2YR4-E6JH] (last visited Nov. 3, 2020).
180. See Sharon O’Malley, Manhattan DA Launches Task Force to Investigate
Corruption in Construction Industry, CONSTR. DIVE (Aug. 6, 2015),
https://www.constructiondive.com/news/manhattan-da-launches-task-force-toinvestigate-corruption-in-construction/403552/ [https://perma.cc/9EPE-3LM3].
181. See New York City and State Partners Announce Joint Effort to Combat
Wage Theft in the Construction Industry, MANHATTAN DIST. ATT’Y’S OFF. (Dec. 4,
2017),
https://www.manhattanda.org/new-york-city-and-state-partners-announcejoint-effort-combat-wage-theft-construction/ [https://perma.cc/35C6-HG9U].
182. See id.
183. See id.
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laws. They show that the tools inspectors lack — stiff fines, asset
seizure, business closure — or too often fail to employ — criminal
penalties — can be used by prosecutors to punish labor law violators
and provide restitution to workers. Even more, some DAs and AGs
have adapted best practices of inspectorate reform by collaborating
with worker groups and targeting particular industries.
III. PROSECUTORS ENFORCING LABOR LAWS:
CRITIQUES AND BEST PRACTICES

Labor law enforcement by DAs and AGs is not without its
challenges, particularly where undocumented workers are involved.
The final Part of the Note will address both critiques of this model
and best practices to ensure that these powerful tools are being
leveraged safely and effectively. In particular, this Note advocates for
DAs and AGs to partner explicitly with worker groups and to focus
their investigations and prosecutions in particular industries or on
specific employer tactics.
This Note highlights these two
interventions because, in the limited sample size of prosecutions, they
have proven most effective. Additionally, given the elevated risk to
undocumented workers in engaging with law enforcement officials,
worker groups can not only benefit the investigation and prosecution
but also provide security for vulnerable workers who engage agents of
the criminal justice system.
A. Critiques of DAs and AGs Enforcing Labor Laws

Encouraging DAs and AGs to enforce labor laws presents three
core concerns: whether and how they can undertake this work in this
first place, how to protect vulnerable workers from the possible
negative consequences of engaging law enforcement, and how to
ensure that DAs and AGs pursue workers’ interests, not simply
punishment of employers. Additionally, one commentator employs a
criminal justice lens to critique, as a foundational matter, the use of
criminal law to solve the problem of wage theft. The following
subsection will take each of these in turn.
A fundamental need for AGs and DAs to prosecute wage theft is
the jurisdictional authority,184 and political will, to do so. Some states
have enacted laws that create criminal penalties for wage theft,

184. States give a range of criminal enforcement authority to their AGs. Some, like
Connecticut, offer them no criminal authority; others, like Delaware and Rhode
Island, give state AGs exclusive criminal jurisdiction. Most states are somewhere in
the middle. See GERSTEIN, WORKERS’ RIGHTS, supra note 139, at 15.
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explicitly empowering AGs and DAs to pursue these employers.185 In
other jurisdictions, enforcement agents must creatively prosecute
under fraud or theft of services laws to interrupt these employers’
criminal business practices.186 In 33 states, for example, criminal
codes allow for theft of services law prosecution.187 Realistically,
some DAs or AGs simply may not have clear paths to pursuing bad
actor employers or may simply refuse to undertake the creative
investigations to hold these employers accountable.
Unlike
inspectors with a clear list of potential punishments for discrete
violations, this model depends more heavily on the individual
initiative and priorities of these law enforcement lawyers and the
context in which they work. Additionally, because many DAs and
AGs are elected officials or are in the public eye, they are subject to
greater political pressure than inspectors.188 This may cause shifting
priorities and approaches as political whims change. Some might
attribute recent prosecutorial involvement in labor law as a political
fad,189 but the core need for actors with their tools and purview will
persist in the absence of profound inspectorate reforms.
Beyond the question of jurisdiction, DAs and AGs may struggle to
obtain the right number and types of cases. Under the current
enforcement regime, worker complaints are directed primarily to
state and federal departments of labor, not to police or prosecutors.
Consequently, interested prosecutors may not receive sufficient
numbers of complaints to generate cases that are either appropriate
for criminal prosecution or have the potential impact they desire.190
Additionally, even where they may be sufficient in number,
complaints that prosecutors receive may not represent the full scope
of workplace problems, which arguably inhibits a systematic selection
of cases to bring.191

185. See Lee & Smith, supra note 5, at 777–80.
186. See Stephen Lee, Policing Wage Theft in the Day Labor Market, 4 U.C.
IRVINE L. REV. 655, 663 (2014); see also Rosado Marzán, Wage Theft as Crime, supra
note 2, at 303.
187. See Lee, supra note 186, at 663.
188. See Lee & Smith, supra note 5, at 796 (“Where prosecutors are elected rather
than appointed, they, too, may be reluctant to prosecute local businesses —
particularly popular or influential ones — fearing that such action will harm their
chances of reelection.”).
189. See Flanagan, supra note 137, at 124.
190. See id. at 116 (arguing that state AGs may struggle to identify vulnerable
workers). Given the elevated burden of proof required for a finding of criminal guilt,
not every case of wage theft is appropriate for criminal prosecution.
191. See Lee, supra note 186, at 677 (“[E]nforcing wage theft laws against bad
actor employers may serve only to cut off low-hanging fruit . . . . [W]e might miss out

2021]

MAKING WAGE THEFT COSTLY

139

Engaging with law enforcement presents clear risks for vulnerable
workers, as well, particularly but not exclusively for undocumented
workers. Critics correctly identify this model’s dependence on
prosecutorial discretion,192 which is cause for concern given the
history of law enforcement intervention on the side of employers. In
the first half of the twentieth century, police frequently used violence
to put down worker strikes in favor of employers, with workers left
wounded or dead.193 More recently, the collaboration between local
police and federal immigration authorities has led to severe
consequences for some workers who have exercised their workplace
rights.194 Particularly in more conservative jurisdictions, workers’
attempts to reclaim these rights can result in the employer calling the
police and/or immigration authorities to intervene.195 Even if only
local police arrive, any engagement with law enforcement has the
very real potential to trigger adverse immigration consequences as
severe as deportation.196
Further, critics highlight that DAs and AGs traditionally do not
seek to make the victim whole; rather, they pursue justice on behalf
of society.197 This does not preclude seeking restitution for workers,
however, as demonstrated above.198 In fact, in the criminal labor law
prosecutions that have occurred, employers have largely avoided jail
time by pleading guilty and making restitution payments to affected

on the structural factors creating the opportunities for wage theft.”). Additionally,
complaint-driven approaches are also inherently reactive and may not represent the
full scope of — or even the worst — problems on the ground. See WEIL, THE
FISSURED WORKPLACE, supra note 51, at 361. See generally Weil & Pyles, supra note
63 (examining the workers who are most likely to complain and how that limits
enforcement effectiveness).
192. See Ben Levin, Prosecutorial Power, Prisons, and the Problem with Wage
Theft Criminalization: A Reply, ONLABOR (Apr. 30, 2018), https://www.onlabor.org/
prosecutorial-power-prisons-and-the-problem-with-wage-theft-criminalization-areply/ [https://perma.cc/GZ4A-KPTG].
193. See generally Ahmed A. White, The Depression Era Sit-Down Strikes and
the Limits of Liberal Labor Law, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 1 (2010) (overviewing
public and private police involvement in putting down worker strikes).
194. See generally Lee, supra note 186.
195. For stories of employers calling Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE) after workers assert their rights, see REBECCA SMITH, ANA AVENDAÑO &
JULIE MARTÍNEZ ORTEGA, ICED OUT: HOW IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT HAS
INTERFERED WITH WORKERS’ RIGHTS 15–27 (2009).
196. For a discussion of the ways local police affirmatively collaborate with ICE or
are otherwise obliged to share information with them, see generally Ingrid V. Eagly,

Criminal Justice for Noncitizens: An Analysis of Variation in Local Law
Enforcement, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1126 (2013). See also Lee, supra note 186.
197. See Flanagan, supra note 137, at 103–04.
198. See discussion supra Section II.C.
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workers.199 Critics argue that criminalizing employment violations
may encourage prosecutors to seek the harshest punishment possible,
regardless of the worker’s interest.200 In the limited sample size for
this work, however, DAs and AGs have not ignored workers’ pleas
for restitution in favor of stiffer jail sentences.201 On the contrary, jail
time has largely been used as a backstop for failure to pay
restitution.202 Instead of seeking the harshest punishments possible,
prosecutors have deployed their tools to compel compliance in ways
that inspectors and private litigants cannot,203 like seizing assets or
suspending a sentence of incarceration contingent on the payment of
full restitution.
In contrast to critics of criminal labor law enforcement, some
scholars argue that wage violations, in particular, should be
prosecuted as a “serious social hazard.”204 For many, wage theft
should be understood as real theft, even if the employee has not yet
come into possession of the property.205 Unlike civil courts or
government agencies, the criminal justice system is uniquely situated

199. See discussion supra Section II.C; see also CPR’s Crimes Against Workers
Database,
CTR.
FOR
PROGRESSIVE
REFORM,
https://progressivereform.org/lists/incidents/ [https://perma.cc/5EKX-YYZB] (last
visited Mar. 18, 2021).
200. See, e.g., Ben Levin, Rethinking Wage Theft Criminalization, ONLABOR
(Apr. 13, 2018), http://www.onlabor.org/rethinking-wage-theft-criminalization/
[https://perma.cc/U7V7-YX9U].
201. For a comprehensive overview of AG involvement in labor law enforcement,
see GERSTEIN, WORKERS’ RIGHTS, supra note 139, at 4.
202. See id. at 5. But see Dave Jamieson, Papa John’s Franchisee Gets Jail Time
for Failing to Pay Full Wages, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 19, 2015),
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/papa-johns-wage-theft_n_564a16e9e4b045bf3df02826
[https://perma.cc/4DU2-9PSZ] (describing a franchisee employer’s sentence of 60
days in jail, restitution to workers, and civil money penalties).
203. See Hallett, supra note 2, at 136 (“One of the problems with the current
enforcement regime is that workers cannot be assured that they will recover their
wages if they file a complaint.”).
204. See Vosko et al., supra note 32, at 259.
205. See Rosado Marzán, Wage Theft as Crime, supra note 2, at 303. In New York,
for example, stealing more than $3,000 of “property” can land you in prison for up to
seven years and a fine up to double the amount of the offender’s gain from the theft.
See N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 70.00, 80.00, 155.35 (McKinney 2010). Questions exist
whether wages are properly understood as “property” for purposes of larceny,
because they have not yet come into the worker’s “possession.” See N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 155.00 (McKinney 2010). Even where prosecutors choose not bring larceny charges,
other options, like theft of services, are available to prosecute employers in some
jurisdictions. See generally Rita J. Verga, An Advocate’s Toolkit: Using Criminal
“Theft of Service” Laws to Enforce Workers’ Right to Be Paid, 8 N.Y.C. L. REV. 283
(2005) (outlining where and how prosecutors can use theft of service laws to pursue
employers).
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to issue moral condemnation for these wrongful takings.206 Apart
from questions of enforcement efficacy, for many advocates, wage
theft is indeed criminal behavior and should be enforced
accordingly.207
Additionally, some advocates argue that because wage theft harms
not only individual employees and their families but also wider
society, prosecutors are well-suited to pursue justice on behalf of the
people.208 Left unchecked, this employer behavior “contributes
to . . . a gloves-off labour market in which public decency is sacrificed
to the drive to maximise profits at any cost.”209 The costs of wage
theft are externalized not only to workers and their communities but
throughout society in the form of lost tax revenue and increased
strain on social welfare programs.210 A landmark study of wage theft
in major U.S. cities found that failure to pay the minimum wage
increased poverty rates among workers experiencing wage theft by
22.9% in California and 40.6% in New York.211 For prosecutors
seeking to enforce laws whose contravention has wide-ranging
societal impacts, wage theft is a natural fit.
Alongside structural concerns about how prosecutors would
undertake this work, one criminal justice reformer has criticized
worker advocates’ embrace of the tools of the criminal justice system
— the same system that has decimated communities of color and
undocumented immigrants. In his recent article, written from his
position as an advocate for decarceration,212 Benjamin Levin

206. See Lee, supra note 186, at 676 (“[T]he criminalization of wage theft creates
unique opportunities to debate the moral dimensions of a labor market . . . .”).
207. See, e.g., Diana Florence & Catalina Cruz, Opinion: Wage Theft Is a Criminal
Act.
Treat
It
as
Such,
CITYLIMITS
(July
16,
2020),
https://citylimits.org/2020/07/16/opinion-wage-theft-is-a-criminal-act-treat-it-as-such/
[https://perma.cc/H24B-4J36]; Terri Gerstein, Stealing from Workers Is a Crime. Why
Don’t More Prosecutors See It That Way?, NATION (May 24, 2018),
https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/stealing-from-workers-is-a-crime-whydont-prosecutors-see-it-that-way/ [https://perma.cc/5769-52YS]; see also Rosado
Marzán, Wage Theft as Crime, supra note 2, at 308.
208. See Hatch & Gerstein, supra note 13; see also Florence & Cruz, supra note
207.
209. See Vosko et al., supra note 32, at 259 (citation omitted).
210. See COOPER & KROEGER, supra note 5, at 8.
211. See id.
212. For more on decarceration and prison abolition, see, e.g., ANGELA DAVIS,
ARE PRISONS OBSOLETE? (2003); Robert H. Ambrose, Note: Decarceration in a Mass
Incarceration State: The Road to Prison Abolition, 45 MITCHELL HAMLINE L. REV.
732 (2019); John Washington, What Is Prison Abolition?, NATION (July 31, 2018),
https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/what-is-prison-abolition/
[https://perma.cc/G3EP-G5AV].
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questions the effectiveness of wage theft prosecutions and cautions
against progressive advocates’ desire to criminalize objectionable
conduct as a policy solution.213 Levin argues that advocates’ calls to
prosecute wage theft serve to perpetuate the existence of a criminal
justice system.214 He also questions the theoretical legitimacy of
criminalizing wage theft along retributive and deterrent
justifications.215
Levin’s critique, however, misses the mark in several key ways.
First, Levin elides criminal prosecution and incarceration.216 In doing
so, he fails to acknowledge that advocates have not consistently
sought jail time as a required punishment.217 Additionally, by not
reviewing the wage theft prosecutions that have taken place, Levin
overlooks how employers have largely avoided incarceration by
paying workers and penalties.218 Further, by conflating prosecution
and incarceration, Levin fails to appreciate the distinction in tools
available to prosecutors that both enforcement agencies and
plaintiffs’ attorneys lack, like seizing assets or enforcing a broad array
of workplace conduct.219 Secondly, by remaining on a purely
theoretical plane, Levin refuses to reckon with the practical need for
alternatives to an enforcement infrastructure that routinely fails to
serve workers’ and society’s needs. In so doing, Levin misses the
thrust of advocates’ arguments: not that they would prefer that
prosecutors pursue criminal penalties for wage theft but that

213. See generally Benjamin Levin, Wage Theft Criminalization, 54 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1429 (2021).
214. See id. at 1495.
215. See id. at 1450 (“[I]t is not at all clear to me that retributivism requires (or
justifies) any sort of carceral punishment for wage theft.” (citation omitted)); see also
id. at 1459 (questioning the “assumptions” that employers are “rational actors” and
that “prison or jail sentences are an effective way to prevent employers from stealing
wages”).
216. See id. at 1462 (“By embracing an argument that caging people is an
acceptable approach if it deters bad conduct, workers’ rights advocates have accepted
and embraced a core component of our harshly punitive system.”). Notably, Levin
fails to cite any advocates who argue for incarceration as a required punishment for
successful wage theft prosecutions. Id.
217. See GERSTEIN, WORKERS’ RIGHTS, supra note 139, at 4.
218. See discussion supra Section II.C.
219. See discussion supra Section II.B. In other countries, these tools are not
restricted to prosecutors; labor inspectors have them, too. Chilean labor inspectors
can subpoena employers, conduct mandatory conciliations, and levy heavy fines that
compel employer compliance. See Rosado Marzán, Punishment and Work Law
Compliance, supra note 10. French inspectors have wide-reaching abilities to examine
any part of the employer’s operations that “deals with the applications of legal
provisions.” See Vericel, supra note 33, at 306. In cases of wage theft, French
inspectors can demand that employers pay wages immediately. See id. at 323.
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prosecutors can fill some of the enforcement gap and effectively
enforce bad actor employers where inspectors have failed.220
Properly understood, advocates’ cries that “wage theft is a crime”221
do not seek criminal penalties instead of a robust inspectorate
enforcement system or even that bad actor employers should be
incarcerated.222 Rather, when confronted with scofflaw employers
who steal a worker’s wages combined with the sustained enforcement
gap, advocates have developed creative approaches and sought new
legal tools to find justice for and with exploited workers.223
Levin’s warnings about the use of criminal tools to solve public ills
are important to consider, given how communities of color,
immigrants, and working-class individuals have suffered
disproportionately from the criminal justice system.224 Along with
other advocates, this Note, however, does not propose AG and DA
prosecution of labor laws as a replacement for other enforcement
regimes or as an unrestrained use of criminal justice powers. Instead,
prosecutors’ intervention should be configured specifically to ensure
that workers are protected and that resources are used responsibly to
pursue the true bad actor employers that abuse their workers.

220. Wage theft is one of many strategies bad actor employers use to exploit
workers, and advocates have sought criminal penalties for many of them. See
OBERNAUER, supra note 175, at 22; see also Michael Gannon, Peralta Pushing to Pass
Carlos’
Law,
QUEENS
CHRON.
(May
10,
2018),
https://www.qchron.com/editions/queenswide/peralta-pushing-to-pass-carloslaw/article_64006adc-7caa-5407-b2b1-4aa6df50c8eb.html
[https://perma.cc/5E5CJLVR] (quoting the Executive Director of New Immigrant Community
Empowerment, a worker center, advocating for new criminal penalties for employers
in cases of a worker death or serious injury).
221. See Levin, supra note 213, at 1446.
222. Levin also argues that by singling out wage theft for criminal penalties,
advocates “risk legitimating other employer behaviors and structures of economic
inequality.” See id. at 1488 (citations omitted). Worker advocates, however, seek
criminal penalties for a range of employer conduct. See, e.g., Gannon, supra note 220
(health and safety); NAT’L EMP. L. PROJECT, EXPOSING WAGE THEFT WITHOUT
FEAR: STATES MUST PROTECT WORKERS FROM RETALIATION 24–25 (2019),
https://s27147.pcdn.co/wp-content/uploads/Retal-Report-6-26-19.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3FVB-U294] (employer retaliation).
223. For examples of the range of approaches taken by advocates, including
criminal penalties, see generally Lee & Smith, supra note 5.
224. See, e.g., Wendy Sawyer & Peter Wagner, Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie,
PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Mar. 24, 2020), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/
reports/pie2020.html [https://perma.cc/6UN3-T8UF].
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B. Best Practice: Collaboration with Worker Groups

Given the above challenges and critiques, in order to both protect
vulnerable workers and ensure successful prosecutions, DAs and
AGs must pursue this work under specific conditions.225 Many of the
best practices identified for inspectorate reform have been adopted
already by some DAs and AGs who pursue this work: partnering with
worker groups, targeting particular industries in which worker abuse
spans a multiplicity of violations, and collaborating with other
agencies to multiply resource efficiency.
Collaboration with worker groups is critical to the success of DA
and AG labor law enforcement, both to protect workers’ interests in
the legal process and to assist prosecutors in receiving complaints and
targeting the right employers.226
Because prosecutors cannot
proactively inspect workplaces, they need a way to identify pressing
issues on the ground and surface complaints from vulnerable
workers.227 Worker groups can fill this gap.228 They can also serve as
a buffer between workers and law enforcement,229 which is
particularly critical where vulnerable workers are involved. Because
prosecutors often have little experience with labor violations and
specific industry practices, worker groups can guide their
investigations and secure witnesses for case development while also
accompanying workers throughout the case.230 Additionally, worker

225. For one description of the ideal circumstances under which criminalization of
wage theft might operate, see Rosado Marzán, Wage Theft as Crime, supra note 2, at
310–14.
226. See Hatch & Gerstein, supra note 13 (“Workers’ rights enforcement requires
extensive collaboration and partnership with civil society — worker centers, unions,
advocacy groups — because these groups are based in communities, know conditions
on the ground, and have the trust of workers who may be unlikely to reach out to the
government.”).
227. See Flanagan, supra note 137, at 116.
228. Janice Fine proposes partnerships with worker groups to address the
enforcement gap by detecting violations, conducting outreach, collecting evidence,
and convening partnerships. See Fine, supra note 8, at 825–26. For a broad
description of worker centers, which serve and organize non-union workers
(particularly low-wage and immigrant workers), see Héctor R. Cordero-Guzmán,
Worker Center Networks, and the Promise of Protections for Low-Wage Workers, 18
J. LAB. & SOC’Y 31 (2015).
229. See Rosado Marzán, Wage Theft as Crime, supra note 2, at 312; see also Fine
& Gordon, supra note 10, at 561 (describing how worker groups could allow workers
to file claims anonymously, “triggering an investigation without putting specific
workers at risk”).
230. See Flanagan, supra note 137, at 120; see also Fine, supra note 8, at 825;
Alameda Cnty. Press Release, supra note 167 (“The Asian Americans Advancing
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groups can assist in locating impacted workers in instances of large
settlements and alert the prosecutor if the employer is violating the
terms of the settlement or court order or otherwise has reverted to
breaking the law.231
This collaboration between prosecutors and worker groups should
mirror the best practices for inspector partnerships with these
organizations: “formalized,” “sustained,” and “vigorous.”232 As an
example of such a configuration, the Manhattan DA has funded a
partnership with NYC-based worker centers and other worker
advocates, creating the Manhattan Justice for Workers Collaborative
(MJWC).233 Along with goals of promoting outreach to immigrant
workers and training them on their rights, the MJWC seeks to
increase reporting of employers’ criminal activities against low-wage
workers, particularly regarding wage theft and dangerous health and
safety practices.234 The MJWC funding allows worker groups to
expand their outreach and services to immigrant workers in the
construction industry, and it increases the two-way flow of
information between these groups and the Manhattan DA.235
Collaboration between worker groups and DAs and AGs exists in
many jurisdictions. In Massachusetts, the AG partners with civil legal
service providers and worker centers, which assist the AG in hosting
monthly wage theft clinics in four different cities.236 To resolve the
large wage theft case discussed above, the Alameda County DA
worked with a community-based organization and led a joint
investigation with state agencies.237 The New York AG recently
partnered with a worker center in Westchester County to bring

Justice-Asian Law Caucus (AAAJ-ALC) originally referred this case to local
authorities and represented several workers who cooperated in the investigation.”).
231. See Flanagan, supra note 137, at 120–21.
232. See discussion supra Section II.A.
233. See Manhattan Justice for Workers Collaborative, N.Y. COMM. FOR
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH, https://nycosh.org/initiatives/manhattan-justicefor-workers-collaborative/ [https://perma.cc/2YM2-9ADT] (last visited Nov. 3, 2020).
234. See id.
235. E-mail from Sara Feldman, Worker & Immigr. Rts. Dir., New Immigrant
Community Empowerment (NICE), to author (Sept. 2, 2021) (on file with author).
236. Partners include Boston Legal Services, the Brazilian Worker Center, Justice
at Work, and others. See Free Wage Theft Legal Clinic, MASS. OFF. ATT’Y GEN.,
https://www.mass.gov/service-details/free-wage-theft-legal-clinic
[https://perma.cc/DT3F-C8RB] (last visited Dec. 7, 2020); see also OFF. OF THE MASS.
ATT’Y GEN. MAURA HEALEY, LABOR DAY REPORT 2019: PROTECTING
MASSACHUSETTS WORKERS 10 (2019), https://www.mass.gov/doc/ags-labor-dayreport-2019/download [https://perma.cc/KAG9-BG3Z].
237. See Alameda Cnty. Press Release, supra note 167.
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criminal charges against employers who steal wages from day
laborers.238 Through a collaboration with D.C. Jobs with Justice and
other labor organizers, in 2020, the D.C. AG recovered $2.75 million
from an electrical contractor for stealing wages from hundreds of
electrical workers.239
C. Best Practice: Targeting Particular Industries
and Employer Tactics

Similar to scholars’ proposals for maximizing inspectorate
resources,240 DAs and AGs should target particular industries for
focused interventions.
Concentrating prosecution efforts on
industries with a high percentage of vulnerable workers who suffer
from a variety of labor law violations can drive change where other
enforcement has been insufficient, particularly where employers
engage in a panoply of illegal behavior.241 In contrast to specialist
U.S. inspectors who enforce a narrow set of laws, DAs and AGs have
a broad enforcement purview that allows them to pursue a variety of
civil and criminal violations.242 Consequently, where inspectors are
functionally unable to address the full scope of illegal employer
activity that harms workers, prosecutors can enforce a range of this
scofflaw conduct within specific industries.243 Additionally, the

238. See Workers’ Advocates in Westchester Unite Against Rampant Wage Theft,
DON BOSCO WORKERS INC. (Jan. 30, 2018), http://donboscoworkers.org/workersadvocates-in-westchester-unite-against-rampant-wage-theft/ [https://perma.cc/3JK7EYZU].
239. See Natalie Delgadillo, Electrical Contractor Reaches $2.75 Million
Settlement in D.C. Wage Theft Lawsuit, DCIST (Jan. 16, 2020, 1:44 PM),
https://dcist.com/story/20/01/16/electrical-contractor-reaches-2-75-million-settlementin-d-c-wage-theft-lawsuit/ [https://perma.cc/26FW-G8WZ].
240. See discussion of “strategic enforcement” supra Section II.A.
241. See Flanagan, supra note 137, at 118–19 (describing industry-level
enforcement efforts by the N.Y. and D.C. AGs).
242. See generally GERSTEIN, WORKERS’ RIGHTS, supra note 139, at 5 (discussing
the scope of civil and criminal law enforcement by state AGs for workers); Hatch &
Gerstein, supra note 13 (describing DA prosecutions “for crimes including wage theft
(under, for example, larceny, theft of services, or explicit wage theft statutes), payroll
fraud, human trafficking, workplace sexual assault, and predictable and preventable
workplace fatalities”).
243. For examples of prosecutions of employers who violate multiple laws that
affect workers, see generally GERSTEIN, WORKERS’ RIGHTS, supra note 139.
Employer conduct includes schemes not only to avoid paying not only wages but also
payroll taxes, workers’ compensation premiums, and unemployment insurance taxes.

See id.
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industry-level focus often aligns with worker groups, who tend to
organize workers employed in specific industries.244
Prosecutors at the state and local level have demonstrated the
effectiveness of focusing on either industry or particular employer
tactics that employers use. The Manhattan DA’s targeting of the
construction industry shows the possibilities of prosecuting bad actor
employers whose abusive behavior extends across different labor
laws.245 The Massachusetts AG also targets specific industries,
including construction, hospitality, home healthcare, and employment
agencies.246
In the construction industry, in particular, the
Massachusetts AG formed a multilingual Construction Site Field
Team that collaborates with worker groups to monitor sites, ensure
better compliance, and engage with workers.247 The D.C. AG has
elected to focus on illegal worker misclassification for its wide-ranging
impacts on workers and society,248 which has allowed its specialized
attorneys to uncover and prosecute the complex schemes employers
use to cheat workers, pay lower taxes, and undercut competitors.249
These prosecutions are highly contextual: whether and how city
and state prosecutors want to engage this work; which partners are
willing to collaborate; and which industries or employer tactics are
most pressing to enforce. Additionally, available resources clearly
affect the extent to which prosecutors can pursue the above strategies.
Though not feasible in every jurisdiction, AG and DA wage theft
prosecutions have proven effective under specific conditions. This
work is not without guardrails, as illustrated by both the critiques and
limitations mentioned.
Because the criminal justice system’s
consequences can be severe, particularly for communities of color,
this approach must be undertaken carefully and strategically — and in
partnership with worker groups.

244. See Cordero-Guzmán, supra note 228, at 42–44 (describing sector-based
networks and individual organizations).
245. For example, the Construction Fraud Task Force pursues “‘wrongdoing and
unsafe practices’ at construction sites, including fraud, bribery, extortion, money
laundering, bid rigging, larceny and safety violations.” See O’Malley, supra note 180.
246. See LABOR DAY REPORT 2020, supra note 156, at 4–8.
247. See id. at 4.
248. See ATT’Y GEN. FOR THE D.C., ILLEGAL WORKER MISCLASSIFICATION:
PAYROLL FRAUD IN THE DISTRICT’S CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY 1 (2019).
249. See id. at 5–7.
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CONCLUSION

For the foreseeable future, the U.S. inspectorate will remain
hobbled: underfunded, fragmented, and unable to effectively enforce
low-wage industries where wage theft runs rampant. Accordingly,
this enforcement gap — $15 billion per year in wages stolen,
disproportionately borne by workers of color and their communities
— will continue to detrimentally impact vulnerable workers and our
society. In the absence of transformative policy change to the U.S.
inspectorate, employers will continue to exploit workers and
otherwise avoid compliance with the law. Just because U.S.
inspectors lack both sufficient numbers and adequate tools to
influence employers’ compliance decisions does not mean that
workers should suffer the consequences of our policy choices and
political failures. The punitive tools to change an employer’s
compliance equation do exist right now, just not with inspectors: stiff
fines, asset seizure, criminal penalties, and more. Under the right
circumstances and while the inspectorate remains inadequate to
enforce our labor laws, DAs and AGs can and should use these
powerful tools to prosecute wage theft and protect vulnerable
workers. By following the lead of the state and local prosecutors who
have paved the way in partnership with worker groups and by
targeting particular industries or employer behavior, more DAs and
AGs can help abate the epidemic of wage theft by making it much
more costly for employers to steal from their workers.

